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Contract Claims and the "Willful and
Malicious Injury" Exception to the
Discharge in Bankruptcy
by
Scott F. Norberg*
I. INTRODUCTION
As is often stated, the fresh start in bankruptcy is reserved for the honest
but unfortunate debtor.' Thus, while the discharge generally covers pre-
bankruptcy debts, 2 it does not extend to debts for culpable misconduct by
the debtor.3 The Bankruptcy Code enforces this fundamental tenet in impor-
tant part through § 523(a)(6), which bars the discharge of debts for "willful
and malicious injury."4 Section 523(a)(6) is the most frequently litigated of
the several exceptions to the discharge, with thousands of reported trial court
and appellate decisions, including a Supreme Court opinion.5 It is a frequent
battleground for defining the limits of the scope of the discharge and distin-
guishing debts that are honestly incurred from those that arise from culpable
misconduct by the debtor.
This article focuses on whether and how § 523(a)(6) applies to claims for
breach of contract. Section 523(a)(6) requires a "willful injury," and it is well
settled that an injury is willful if the debtor acted either with the purpose of
causing injury or with substantial certainty that injury would result.6 Liter-
ally applied, this formulation of intent makes a large proportion of contract
claims potentially nondischargeable; in knowingly not performing a contract,
*Professor Norberg is a Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law, Miami,
Florida. He is grateful to Florida International University College of Law for research funding and assis-
tance that supported this work.
'See, e.g., Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 217 (1998) (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287
(1991)); Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 128 (1979) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244
(1934), Wish Acquisition, LLC v. Salvino (In re Salvino), 373 B.R. 578, 591 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007), affd,
2008 WL 182241 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008).
211 U.S.C. §§ 727(b), 1328(a), 1141(d) (2014).
'See discussion infra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
411 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2014). Section 523(a) applies to individual debtors in both Chapter 7 cases, id.
§ 727(b), and Chapter 11 cases, id. § 1141(d)(2). In Chapter 13 only, certain types of debts for "willful or
malicious injury" are excepted from the discharge. Id. § 1325(a)(4) (emphasis added).
'Kawaahua v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
'See discussion infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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a debtor ordinarily is substantially certain that the other party will suffer
injury. This reading of the statute would dramatically reduce the scope of
the fresh start in bankruptcy and bar the discharge of debts for conduct that
is not generally regarded as dishonest or culpable. The courts are in agree-
ment that claims for simple knowing breach of contract are dischargeable
despite § 523(a)(6), 7 but beyond this common ground, they are divided. The
case law is in disarray regarding the application of the "willful and malicious
injury" exception to contract claims.
Some courts have held that tortious conduct is an essential element for
nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6), categorically excluding contract claims
from the ambit of the exception unless the breach is also tortious or accompa-
nied by an independent tort.8 Other courts have held or simply assumed that
§ 523(a)(6) may apply to any type of claim, including contract claims, with-
out articulating a viable principle for distinguishing between a simple know-
ing breach of contract and one that results in a willful and malicious injury.9
The premise of this article is that "willfulness" under § 523(a)(6) implic-
itly requires voluntary and affirmative conduct by the debtor as well as delib-
erate and intentional injury, and that this requirement of voluntary,
affirmative conduct effectively ensures the discharge of claims for simple
knowing breach of contract without categorically excluding all contract
claims from the compass of the exception. While the terms, "willful" and
"malicious," are commonly associated with intentional torts,10 and the pri-
mary application of § 523(a)(6) is to intentional torts, the statute does not
expressly exclude non-tort claims. Thus, a prudent reading of the statute will
be informed by tort principles, but will not categorically exclude non-tortious
conduct from the scope of the exception.
Intentional torts generally require voluntary and affirmative conduct by
the tortfeasor; a failure to act ordinarily cannot give rise to liability for an
intentional tort.'1 Because § 523(a)(6) applies only to intentional and not to
other torts, as the Supreme Court held in Kawaahau v. Geiger,12 it follows
that any tort claim that is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) must arise
from affirmative as well as deliberate and malicious conduct. Section
523(a)(6) should likewise be read to cover contract claims if, and only if, the
debtor acted voluntarily and affirmatively as well as deliberately and mali-
"See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY [ 523.08[1][d] (Alan Resnick & Henry Sommer eds., 16th ed.
2013).
'See discussion infra notes 58, 61, 65 and 97 and accompanying text.
'See discussion infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
"oSee Kawaahua at 61-62 (describing how willful and malicious injuries are often associated with tort
claims).
"See discussion infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
12523 U.S. 57 (1998) (holding that § 523(a)(6) requires intent to injure, and thus does not cover claims
arising from conduct that is merely negligent or reckless).
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ciously in breaching a contract. Mere nonperformance of a contract, even if
specifically intended to harm the other party, would not give rise to a nondis-
chargeable debt under § 523(a)(6). This reading of the statute parallels its
application to debts for intentional torts, while remaining faithful to the text,
and furthers the purpose of the statute to bar the discharge of debts for
culpable misconduct by the debtor.
As a practical matter, reading § 523(a)(6) as implicitly requiring volun-
tary and affirmative conduct will mean that the vast majority of contract
claims will be dischargeable under the statute. On the other hand, nondis-
chargeable contract claims will likely include claims for breach of a covenant
not to compete and claims for failure to remit funds from a specified source.
Whereas the vast majority of claims for breach of contract involve no volun-
tary, affirmative conduct by the debtor, the breach of a noncompetition
agreement typically involves more than mere nonperformance of a contract
obligation. Likewise, the failure to pay funds from a designated source may
also involve voluntary, affirmative conduct that causes a willful and malicious
injury.
There are numerous scenarios in which courts have considered whether a
contract claim was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).13 These cases usu-
ally involve one of three types of contracts: covenants not to compete; agree-
ments to pay an obligation from a designated source of funds; and home
construction or renovation contracts.14 Consistent with this paper's thesis
that "willfulness" requires conduct that is voluntary and affirmative as well
as deliberate and intentional, courts have repeatedly found debts for violation
of a covenant not to compete and for misappropriation of earmarked funds to
be nondischargeable. On the other hand, most courts have ruled that debts
for breach of a construction or renovation contract are dischargeable. These
cases almost invariably involve mere nonperformance and simple breaches of
contract.
Part II of this article provides an overview of § 523(a)(6). It includes an
analysis of the structure of the statute, in particular in the context of the
several provisions that limit the discharge in bankruptcy to honest but unfor-
tunate debtors. It further outlines the tests for "willful and malicious" injury.
Part III catalogs the split among the circuit courts of appeal on whether
tortious conduct is an essential element for nondischargeability under
§ 523(a)(6). Part IV frames the central dilemma of interpreting § 523(a)(6)
so as to exclude claims for mere knowing breach of contract, while not cate-
gorically excluding all contract claims that arise from culpable misconduct by
the debtor. It examines five possible approaches to the issue, including the
"See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 142-46.
14See cases cited infra notes 148-89 and accompanying text.
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premise that § 523(a)(6) requires voluntary, affirmative conduct by the
debtor. Part V is a brief conclusion. Finally, the article also includes an
Appendix that scrutinizes the opinions of appellate courts in each circuit on
whether § 523(a)(6) requires tortious conduct as an element of the exception
to discharge.
II. OVERVIEW OF SECTION 523(A)(6)
A. DEBTOR MISCONDUCT AND THE DISCHARGE
Section 523(a)(6) is one of several Bankruptcy Code provisions that to-
gether operate to limit the discharge to "honest" debtors and "honestly" in-
curred debts.15 In Chapter 7, § 727(a) bars the discharge of all pre-
bankruptcy debts when the debtor has behaved dishonestly in connection
with the bankruptcy case itself,' 6 while § 523(a) precludes the discharge of
certain categories of debts, owed to a particular creditor, including debts for
"willful and malicious injury" and other debts for dishonest or other culpable
misconduct.' 7 In Chapter 13, § 1328(a),18 like § 523(a), bars the discharge of
particular types of debts, including certain debts for "willful or malicious in-
jury" and various other debts resulting from culpable misconduct by the
debtor.19 In both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, the Code further limits relief to
"
5See generally Bundy American Corp. v. Blankfort (In re Blankfort), 217 B.R. 138, 144 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1998) (explaining that "[t]he cases in which courts denied requests for non-dischargeability
under § 523(a)(6) have as a common theme that persons of honest character could have committed the
acts or mistakes which led to legal liability.").
1611 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)-(12). These types of debts are also nondischargeable in any future bankruptcy
case filed by the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(10) (excepting from discharge any debt -that was or could
have been listed ... in a prior case concerning the debtor ... in which the debtor waived discharge, or was
denied a discharge").
71n addition to debts for willful and malicious injury, § 523(a) bars the discharge of debts for fraud, 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (covering debts "for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing
of credit, to the extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud"), § 523(a)(4)
(covering debts "for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny"),
§ 523(a)(11) (covering debts "arising from any act of fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capac-
ity committed with respect to any depository institution or insured credit union"); § 523(a)(7) (covering
debts "for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit); § 523(a)(9)
(covering debts "for death or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle, vessel or
aircraft if such operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or
another substance"); § 523(a)(12) (covering debts for malicious or reckless failure to fulfill a commitment
to a federal depository institution regulatory agency to maintain required capital); § 523(a)(13) (covering
debts for payment of an order of restitution for a bankruptcy crime under title 18 of the United States
Code); and § 523(a)(19) (covering debts for violation of federal or state securities laws). Pursuant to Code
§ 523(c), claims under § 523(a)(2), (4) and (6) are discharged unless the creditor files a complaint objecting
to dischargeability in the bankruptcy case and the bankruptcy court determines the debt nondischargeable.
All other § 523(a) claims survive the discharge without a determination by the bankruptcy court. 11
U.S.C. § 523(c).
i8ll U.S.C. § 1328(a).
OThe scope of the discharge in Chapter 13 is somewhat broader than in Chapter 7. Compare 11
U.S.C § 523(a) (listing debts that are nondischargeable in Chapter 7 and 11 cases) with 11 U.S.C.
2014) WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS INJURY 179
honest but unfortunate debtors by providing for the dismissal of cases for
cause20 or abuse of bankruptcy laws.2
Section 523(a)(6) is potentially applicable in a much broader range of
cases than any of the other exceptions to the discharge, thus explaining the
frequency with which it is litigated. Whereas most of the other exceptions
are confined to particular types of claims, for example, fraud, larceny, or driv-
ing under the influence,22 § 523(a)(6) on its face covers any type of claim, as
long as it is for a willful and malicious injury.23  Thus, § 523(a)(6) appears to
be a catch-all provision. A creditor who believes that its claim arises from
some misconduct on the part of the debtor, but which claim does not fall
within any of the other exceptions to discharge, often seeks a nondis-
§ 1328(a) (listing debts that are nondischargeable in Chapter 13 cases). In addition, certain debts for
"willful or malicious injury" and certain debts that are included in a sentence for a criminal conviction are
nondischargeable in Chapter 13. Id. § 1328(a)(4) (debts "for restitution, or damages, awarded in a civil
action against the debtor as a result of willful or malicious injury by the debtor that caused personal injury
to an individual or death of an individual") and § 1328(a)(3) (debts 'for restitution, or a criminal fine,
included in a sentence on the debtor's conviction of a crime"). There is no counterpart to § 727(a) in
Chapter 13 that would prevent discharge of all debts if the debtor has been dishonest in connection with
the case itself, but Chapter 13, like Chapter 7, permits dismissal of a case for "cause," including bad faith.
Id. § 1307(c). See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
20See §§ 707(a), 1307(c) (indicating that 'cause" includes bad faith). See Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare
Physical Therapy, LLC (In re Piazza), 719 F.3d 1253, 1271-74 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of
Chapter 7 case based on totality of the circumstances where debtor filed bankruptcy to avoid paying a
large single debt, while continuing to pay the debts of insiders; failed to make life-style adjustments despite
his debts; and failed to pay creditors although he had the wherewithal to pay a portion of his debts);
Industrial Ins. Svcs. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1129 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that "[d]ismissal
based on lack of good faith must be undertaken on an ad hoc basis" and that it "is generally utilized only in
those egregious cases that entail concealed or misrepresented assets and/or sources of income, and exces-
sive and continued expenditures, lavish lifestyle, and intention to avoid a large single debt based on con-
duct akin to fraud, misconduct, or gross negligence").
2 See § 707(b) (describing how "abuse" may be grounds for dismissal of a Chapter 7 case where the
debtor can afford to repay a meaningful amount of unsecured debt in a Chapter 13 case).
"See supra note 17 (listing debts that are nondischargeable because they arise from debtor
misconduct).
23Nonbankruptcy law governs whether the claimant holds a claim, see 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (provid-
ing that the bankruptcy court shall allow a claim "except to the extent that such claim is unenforceable
against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law for a reason other
than because such claim is contingent or unmatured"), while bankruptcy law determines whether that
claim is for a willful and malicious injury, see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). A creditor pursuing collection of its
claim before bankruptcy need not prove a willful and malicious injury in the nonbankruptcy forum in order
to assert an objection to the dischargeability of that debt under § 523(a)(6) in a subsequent bankruptcy
proceeding. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 134-38 (1979) (holding that creditor was not required to
prove willful and malicious injury in prebankruptcy debt collection action in order to have its debt deter-
mined nondischargeable in subsequent bankruptcy proceeding). Thus, for example, in Banks v. Gill Distri-
bution Centers, Inc., 263 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2001), the court held that a claim was nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(6) where the debtor had converted the creditor's collateral, although before bankruptcy the credi-
tor had obtained judgment against the debtor in contract for breach of the security agreement, not in tort
for conversion (and indeed had not filed its action to determine the debt nondischargeable until after the
tort statute of limitations had run).
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chargeability determination under § 523(a)(6) as a last resort to prevent the
discharge of its claim in bankruptcy. 24 Also, § 523(a)(6) potentially overlaps
with other exceptions to discharge, for example, the exceptions for fraud and
embezzlement, 25 so that creditors frequently include counts under both
§ 523(a)(6) and another exception to discharge.
B. WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS INJURY: THE BASIC STANDARDS
It is generally accepted that "willful" and "malicious" are separate and
distinct requirements for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6). 2 6
1. Willful Injury
Kawaahau v. Geiger27 is the most significant decision addressing the
meaning of "willful" in Code § 523(a)(6). Before Geiger, courts were split on
whether the § 523(a)(6) exception requires an intentional injury, or whether
debts for intentional acts that result in negligent or reckless injuries qualified
for the exception.28 In Geiger, the Supreme Court held that the exception
24See, e.g., Liddell v. Peckham (In re Peckham), 442 B.R. 62 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) (creditor's com-
plaint sought exception to discharge under both § 523(a)(2)(A) (actual fraud) and § 523(a)(6) (willful and
malicious injury; bankruptcy court entered judgment for the creditor on the actual fraud count and judg-
ment for the debtor on the willful and malicious injury count). See also George H. Singer, Section 523 of
the Bankruptcy Code: The Fundamentals of Nondischargeability in Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM.
BANKR. L. J. 325, 375-76 (1997) (stating that § 523(a)(6) "is often relied upon by creditors as a catch-all
for redressing alleged wrongs that do not fit squarely into any other provision.").
2511 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (excepting from discharge certain debts incurred through false pretenses, a
false representation, or actual fraud); id. § 523(a)(4) (excepting from discharge debts "for fraud or defalca-
tion while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny").
26See, e.g., Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (focusing exclusively on the willfulness prong of § 523(a)(6)); Tinker v.
Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485 (1904) (adverting to "an injury ... which is both malicious and willful"); Sells
v. Porter (In re Porter), 539 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2008) (showing a case of willful and malicious conduct
under § 523(a)(6) that resulted in exception from discharging judgment debt from a sexual harassment
case); Blocker v. Patch (In re Patch), 526 F.3d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir. 2008) (determining that "[t]o establish
that a debt is nondischargeable consistent with this exception, the party seeking to prevent discharge must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the debt is for both" willful and malicious injury); Fischer v.
Scarborough (In re Scarborough), 171 F.3d 638, 641 (8th Cir. 1999) (asserting that "[w]illful and malicious
are two distinct requirements"); Markowitz v. Campbell (In re Markowitz), 190 F.3d 455, 463 (6th Cir.
1999) (describing willful injury as one in which debtor wants to cause a consequence or could guess
consequences would result from his actions); Monsanto Co. v. Trantham (In re Trantham), 304 B.R. 298
(6th Cir. B.A.P. 2004) (holding that the debtor's debt to the patent holder was the result of willful injury).
See also 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(4) (excepting from the discharge in Chapter 13 certain debts for "willful or
malicious injuries" (emphasis added)); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(12) (excepting from the discharge certain debts
for "malicious or reckless" acts); H.R.REP. NO. 95-595 at 365 (1977), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News at
5963, 6320 (separately addressing the willfulness requirement, stating that "[u]nder [§ 523(a)(6)], 'willful'
means deliberate or intentional"); and S.REP. No. 95-989 at 79 (1978), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News at
5787, 5864 (addressing separately the willfulness requirement, stating that "[u]nder [§ 523(a)(6)], 'willful'
means deliberate or intentional"). But see Miller v. J.D. Abrams, Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598 (5th Cir.
1998) (holding that after Geiger, willfulness and malice constitute a unitary standard under § 523(a)(6)).
27523 U.S. 57 (1998).
2
"Id. at 60.
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covers only "acts done with the actual intent to cause injury."29 The credi-
tors, Mr. and Mrs. Kawaahau, held a state court judgment for medical mal-
practice against the debtor, Dr. Geiger, arising from medical treatment that
the bankruptcy court found was "far below the appropriate standard of care
and therefore ranked as 'willful and malicious."' 30  Mrs. Kawaauhau sought
treatment for a foot injury, and as a result of Geiger's malpractice, her foot
ultimately had to be amputated." Geiger's conduct was negligent if not reck-
less, but he did not act with the intent to injure Mrs. Kawaauhau. 32
The Court took a plain meaning approach to the issue, reasoning that
"willful" means "deliberate or intentional,"33 and that "[t]he word 'willful' in
§ 523(a)(6) modifies the word 'injury."' 34 The Court agreed with the eighth
circuit's observation in the decision below that "the (a)(6) formulation trig-
gers in the lawyer's mind the category 'intentional torts,' as distinguished
from negligent or reckless torts." Quoting from the Restatement (Second) of
Torts' discussion of intent, the Court explained that "[i]ntentional torts gen-
erally require that the actor intend 'the consequences of an act,' not simply
'the act itself.'" 35
291d. at 61.
301d. at 60.
3iId. at 59.
32Id. at 61. The bankruptcy court ruled that the debt was nondischargeable because Dr. Geiger's
repeated "egregious errors" of judgment in treating Mrs. Kawaauhau evidenced an extreme "'disregard of
acceptable medical practice.'" 172 BR. 916, 923 (1994) (quoting Perkins v. Scharffe, 817 F.2d 392, 394
(6th Cir. 1987)), revd,113 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc rehearing), affd, 523 U.S. 57 (1998). The
district court affirmed the bankruptcy court, and the eighth circuit, first in a panel decision, 93 F.3d 443
(8th Cir. 1996), and then on rehearing en banc, 113 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 1997), reversed the district court.
The eighth circuit reasoned that a debt cannot be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) unless it is based on
an intentional tort where the "actor 'desires to cause consequences of his act, or . . . believes that the
consequences are substantially certain to result from it.'" 113 F.3d 848, 852 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A, comment a, at 15 (1965)).
"As support for this proposition, the Court did not cite the Congressional reports accompanying the
enactment of Code § 523(a)(6). The House Report states that "[u]nder this paragraph, 'willful' means
deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker held that a looser standard is intended, and to the
extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a 'reckless disregard' standard, they are overruled."
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 365 (1977), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 5963, 6320. The Senate report
included a nearly identical statement. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 79 (1978), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News at 5787, 5864.
34The ninth circuit once made the point this way: "[The creditor] would interpret [the statute]
essentially to include all acts that are not involuntary. This is wrong. 'Willful' refers to state of mind, not
to motor control." Industrie Aeronauctiche E. Meccaniche Rinaldo Piaggio S.p.A. v. Kasler (In re Kasler),
611 F.2d 308, 310 n.5 (9th Cir. 1979) (construing § 17(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Act, the predecessor of
§ 523(a)(6)).
"Geiger, 523 U.S. at 61-62 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A, cmt. a, at 15 (1964)).
Thus, Geiger does not eliminate the requirement that the debtor act intentionally, and substitute the
requirement that the debtor have an intent to injure. Rather, it adds the latter to the former, so that it
must be shown that the debtor acted voluntarily and intentionally so as to cause harm, and that in so
acting, the debtor intended to cause harm.
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The Court further reasoned that the creditors' broad interpretation of
§ 523(a)(6) could extend the exception to a wide range of cases in which the
act was intentional but the injury was not. "Every traffic accident stemming
from an initial intentional act-for example, intentionally rotating the wheel
of an automobile to make a left-hand turn without first checking oncoming
traffic-could fit within the description."36 The Court further observed, "[a]
'knowing breach of contract' could also qualify" for nondischargeability under
the plaintiffs' interpretation 3 7 clearly suggesting that contract claims, like
negligence claims, fall outside the scope of the exception.38
The Supreme Court in Geiger ruled that § 523(a)(6) applies to 'acts done
with the actual intent to cause injury," 9 but the Court did not elaborate on
what it means for a debtor to intend to cause injury. Following the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts' formulation of intent, all of the post-Geiger circuit
courts of appeal and bankruptcy appellate panel decisions to address the ques-
tion have held that "willfulness" means conduct that is substantially certain
to cause injury.40 Thus, the requirement in Geiger that the debtor intended
361d. at 62.
37Id.
35The Court also reasoned that the broad interpretation of § 523(a)(6) would obviate another of the
exceptions to the discharge, namely § 523(a)(9), see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (excepting debts for death or
personal injury caused by driving unlawfully under the influence of alcohol or drugs).
39Id. at 61.
40 See In re Granoff, 250 Fed. Appx. 494, 495-496 (3d Cit. 2007); Conte v. Gautam (In re Conte), 33
F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 1994) (predating but fully consistent with Geiger); Parsons v. Parks, 91 Fed. Appx. 817
(4th Cir. 2003) (unpublished opinion); Miller v. J.D. Abrams, Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598 (5th Cir.
1998); Berry v. Vollbracht (In re Vollbracht), 276 Fed. Appx. 360 (5th Cit. 2007); Raspanti v. Keaty (In
re Keaty), 397 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2005); Markowitz v. Campbell (In re Markowitz), 190 F.3d 455 (6th
Cir. 1999); Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Gasbarro, 299 Fed. Appx. 499 (6th Cit. 2008); Kowalski v. Romano
(In re Romano), 59 Fed. Appx. 709 (6th Cit. 2003); Kennedy v. Mustaine (In re Kennedy), 249 F.3d 576
(6th Cit. 2001); Monsanto Company v. Trantham (In re Trantham), 304 B.R. 298 (6th Cit. B.A.P. 2004);
The Spring Works, Inc. v. Sarff (In ye Sarff), 242 B.R. 620 (6th Cit. B.A.P. 2000); Geiger v. Kawaahau (In
re Geiger), 113 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 1997), affd, 523 U.S. 55 (1998); Blocker v. Patch (In re Patch), 526 F.3d
1176, 1180 (8th Cit. 2008); Sells v. Porter (In ye Porter), 529 F.3d 889, 894 (8th Cit. 2008); Ormsby v.
First Am. Title Co. of Nev., 591 F.3d 1199 (9th Cit. 2010); Barboza v. New Form, Inc. (In re Barboza),
545 F.3d 702 (9th Cit. 2008); Ditto v. McCurdy, 510 F.3d 1070 (9th Cit. 2007); Quinn v. Barry (In re
larry), 138 Fed. Appx. 898 (9th Cit. 2005); Carillo v. Su (In re Su), 290 F.3d 1140 (9th Cit. 2002);
Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202 (9th Cit. 2001); Peklar v. Ikerd (In re Peklar), 260 F.3d
1035 (9th Cir. 2001); Jones v. Svreck (In re Jones), 300 B.R. 133 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2003); Oney v. Weinberg
(In re Weinberg), 410 BR. 19 (9th Cit. B.A.P. 2009); Maaskant v. Peck (In re Peck), 295 B.R. 343 (9th
Cit. B.A.P. 2003); Thiara v. Spycher Brothers (In re Thiara), 285 B.R. 420 (9th Cit. B.A.P. 2002); Berrien
v. Van Vuuren (In re Berrien), 280 Fed. Appx. 762 (10th Cit. 2008); Panalis v. Moore (In re Moore), 357
F.3d 1125 (10th Cit. 2004); Mitsubishi Motors Credit of Am., Inc. v. Longley (In re Longley), 235 B.R.
651 (10th Cit. B.A.P. 1999); Hope v. Walker (In re Walker), 48 F.3d 1161 (11th Cit. 1995) (predating but
fully consistent with Geiger).
Several bankruptcy courts have held that actual intent to injure is required, and that knowledge that
injury is certain or substantially certain is not sufficient. See Rescuecom Corp. v. Khafaga (In re Khafaga),
419 B.R. 539, 549 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009) (reviewing cases holding that § 523(a)(6) does not require
specific intent to injure and cases holding that § 523(a)(6) requires specific intent to injure).
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to cause injury entails two alternative inquiries: whether the debtor acted
with (1) actual, subjective intent to cause injury, or (2) certainty or substan-
tial certainty that injury would result from his conduct.
There is some disagreement among the circuit courts of appeal on
whether the second inquiry is subjective or objective. The sixth,4' eighth,42
ninth,43 tenth44 and eleventh45 circuits have stated that both of the inquiries
regarding intent are subjective. One circuit court of appeals, the fifth, has
adopted the objective standard regarding whether the debtor's conduct was
substantially certain to cause injury.46 The question is still undecided in the
41See Markowitz v. Campbell (In re Markowitz), 190 F.3d 455, 464 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that
"unless the 'actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or . .. believes that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it' (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A, at 15 (1964)),
he has not committed a 'willful and malicious injury' as defined under § 523(a)(6)"; Sanderson Farms, Inc.
v. Gasbarro, 299 Fed. Appx. 499, 504 (6th Cit. 2008) (reiterating Markowitz); Kowalski v. Romano (In re
Romano), 59 Fed. Appx. 709, 715 (6th Cir. 2003) (reiterating Markowitz); Kennedy v. Mustaine (In re
Kennedy), 249 F.3d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 2001) (reiterating Markowitz); Monsanto Company v. Trantham
(In re Trantham), 304 B.R. 298, 304 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 2004) (reiterating Markowitz); The Spring Works,
Inc. v. Sarff (In re Sarff), 242 B.R. 620, 626 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 2000) (reiterating Markowitz).
4 2Geiger v. Kawaahau (In re Geiger), 113 F.3d at 852-53 (8th Cir. 1997), affd, 523 U.S. 55 (1998)
(holding that debt for medical malpractice was dischargeable, the court reasoned that "[t]here is nothing in
the record . . . that would support a finding that Dr. Geiger believed that it was substantially certain that
his patient would suffer harm") (emphasis in original); Blocker v. Patch (In re Patch), 526 F.3d 1176, 1180-
81 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing 8th circuit decision in Geiger, stating that "the 'willful' element is a subjective
inquiry, requiring proof that the debtor desired to bring about the injury or was in fact substantially
certain that his conduct would result in the injury that occurred"); Sells v. Porter (In re Porter), 539 F.3d
889, 894 (8th Cir. 2008) (reiterating Patch).
4 3Ormsby, 591 F.3d at 1206-07 (articulating a subjective standard, but applying an objective standard;
the debtor argued that a state court judgment for conversion and misappropriation of proprietary informa-
tion did not preclude discharge of the debt because the state court refused a finding that the debtor
subjectively intended to injure the plaintiff, and the court rejoined that the debtor "must have known"
that injury was substantially certain to result from his conduct); Ditto v. McCurdy, 510 F.3d 1070, 1078
(9th Cir. 2007); Quinn v. Barry (In re Barry), 138 Fed. Appx. 898, 899 (9th Cit. 2005); Carillo v. Su (In re
Su), 290 F.3d 1140, 144-45 (9th Cir. 2002); Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th
Cir. 2001) (discussing and approving the subjective standard for determining whether debtor knew that
his conduct was substantially certain to cause injury); Oney v. Weinberg (In re Weinberg), 410 BR. 19, 37
(9th Cir. B.A.P. 2009); Maaskant v. Peck (In re Peck), 295 B.R. 353, 364-65 (9th Cit. B.A.P. 2003); Thiara
v. Spycher Brothers (In re Thiara), 285 BR. 420, 427 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2002).
44Panalis v. Moore (In re Moore), 357 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing In re Longley); Berrien
v. Van Vuuren (In re Berrien), 280 Fed. Appx. 762, 766 (10th Cit. 2008) (reiterating Moore); Mitsubishi
Motors Credit of America, Inc. v. Longley (In re Longley), 235 B.R. 651, 657 (10th Cir. B.A.P. 1999)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A).
45Hope v. Walker (In re Walker), 48 F.3d 1161, 1165 (11th Cir. 1995) (predating but fully consistent
with Geiger).
"Berry v. Vollbracht (In re Vollbracht), 276 Fed. Appx. 360, 361-62 (5th Cir. 2007) (reiterating
Miller formulation); Raspanti v. Keaty (In re Keaty), 397 F.3d 264, 270 (5th Cit. 2005) (reiterating Miller
formulation); Williams v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 520, 337 F.3d 504, 508-
509 (5th Cir. 2003) (reiterating Miller formulation); Miller v. J.D. Abrams, Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d
598, 606 (5th Cit. 1998) (holding that "an injury is willful if the debtor subjectively intended to cause
injury, or if injury was objectively substantially certain to result from the debtor's conduct.").
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first,47 second, third,48 fourth, and seventh circuits.
2. Malicious Injury
In most circuits, the definition of the term "malicious" is derived from the
Supreme Court's decision over 100 years ago in Tinker v. Colwell.49 While
Geiger appears to address only willfulness, Tinker is almost entirely con-
cerned with malice. The core holding in Tinker is that "malice" does not
mean special malice toward the claimant specifically or personally, and that
malice may be implied from the debtor's conduct. Accordingly, the Court
held that the plaintiffs judgment based on the debtor's tortious criminal con-
versation with plaintiffs wife was nondischargeable, although the debtor pre-
sumably harbored no personal animus toward the plaintiff, just an attraction
to his wife. Thus, the holding in Tinker is a negative statement of what
malice is not. However, in discussing what malice is not, the court quoted or
summarized the definitions of malice given in several other cases,50 and thus a
47Roumeliotis v. Popa (In re Popa), 140 F.3d 317, 318 (1st Cir. 1998); Jones v. Svreck (In re Jones),
300 B.R. 133, 140 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2003).
48In re Granoff, 250 Fed. Appx. 494, 495-96 (3d Cir. 2007) (opinion not for publication) (not address-
ing the question, but suggesting that the court would follow the prevailing, subjective approach); Conte v.
Gautam (In re Conte), 33 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 1994) (not addressing the question, but suggesting that the
court would follow the prevailing, subjective approach).
49193 U.S. 473 (1904). The Congressional reports that accompanied enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code in 1978 raise a question whether § 523(a)(6) overruled Tinker. The House Report states that
"[u]nder this paragraph, 'willful' means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker held that a
looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a 'reckless
disregard' standard, they are overruled." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, p. 365 (1977), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News at 5963, 6320. The Senate report included a nearly identical statement. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at
79 (1978), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 5787, 5864. These statements are inconsistent with the
fact that Congress carried over the exception from § 17a of the former Bankruptcy Act with no substan-
tive changes. (In 1970, Congress established a Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States
to study the bankruptcy laws and make recommendations for reform, Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
354, 84 Stat. 468. The Commission proposed no substantive changes to the exception as it existed under
§ 17a of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898). See H.R. Doc. 137, pt. I, at 136-37, 139, 176, 93d Cong. 1st Sess.
(1973). The willful and malicious injury provision was 4-506(a)(7).), and the Code incorporated the excep-
tion essentially as drafted by the Commission. Id. at 136-37, 139, 176. Further, if taken literally, the
reports make little sense; Tinker was primarily concerned with the malice requirement, while the reports
address the meaning of the willfulness requirement. Moreover, Tinker itself stated that the willfulness
requirement meant an intentional and voluntary act. Perhaps, as Professor Tabb has written, "[t]he fairest
reading of the intent of the language in the committee reports is that Congress was directing . . . courts to
stop misapplying Tinker." See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collat-
eral Conversions and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 78 (1990). Several courts
have stated that Congress intended to overrule Tinker in regard to willfulness, but not as to malice. See
Hagan v. McNallen (In re McNallen), 62 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 1995); Conte v. Cautam (In re Conte), 33
F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 1994). (Several circuit courts mentioned this legislative history when, before Geiger,
they adopted the more restrictive standard for willfulness later approved by Geiger. The Supreme Court
in Geiger, however, did not refer to the language in the House and Senate Reports that purports to
overrule Tinker.)
soThe three cases are: Bromage v. Prosser, 4 Barnwell & Cresswell 247, 107 E.R. 1051 (1825); In re
Freche, 109 F. 620 (D.N.J. 1901); and United States v. Reed, 86 F. 308, 312 (C.C.N.Y 1897).
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positive definition of malice can be gleaned from these expositions. Excluding
the aspects of this definition that duplicate the willfulness prong of the stat-
ute as defined in Geiger, Tinker stands for the proposition that 'malice" is
conduct that is "wrongful" and "without just cause or excuse." In fact, most
of the circuit courts have defined malice in this way.5'
"The first, Printy v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 110 F.3d 853 (1st Cir. 1997); Jones v. Svreck (In re
Jones), 300 B.R. 133 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2003); second, Ball v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 451 F.3d 66, 69 (2d Cir.
2002); Navistar Financial Corp. v. Stelluti (In re Stelluti), 94 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 1996); and third, Conte v.
Gautam (In re Conte), 33 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 1994); Laganella v. Braen (In re Braen), 900 F.2d 621 (1990)
circuits have stated a standard for malice that is readily traced to Tinker, that an act is "malicious" if it was
"wrongful and without just cause or excuse, even in the absence of hatred, spite or ill-will." The sixth,
Monsanto Company v. Trantham (In re Trantham), 304 B.R. 298 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 2004); Gonzalez v.
Moffitt (In re Moffitt), 252 B.R. 916 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 2000); and seventh, In re Thirtyacre, 36 F.3d 697,
700 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Wheeler v. Laudani, 783 F.2d 610, 615 (6th Cir. 1986) (relying on Tinker v.
Colwell) circuits have articulated a standard that is closely similar to that of the first, second and third
circuits: "'malicious means in conscious disregard of one's duties or without just cause or excuse; it does
not require ill-will or specific intent.'" Likewise, the eleventh circuit has stated that "malicious" means
'wrongful and without just cause or excessive even in the absence of personal hatred, spite or ill-will."
Lee v. Ikner (In re Ikner), 883 F.2d 986 (11th Cir. 1989); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rebhan, 842 F.2d 1257
(11th Cir. 1988); Hope v. Walker (In re Walker), 48 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 1995). The ninth circuit uses a
four-part test that also incorporates the Tinker definition: "[a] malicious injury involves (1) a wrongful act,
(2) done intentionally, (3) which necessarily causes injury, and (4) is done without just cause or excuse."
See Ormsby v. First Am. Title Co. of Nev., 591 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2010); Barboza v. New Form,
Inc. (In re Barboza), 545 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2008); Jett v. Sicroff (In re Sicroff), 401 F.3d 1101, 1105-06
(9th Cir. 2005); Carillo v. Su (In re Su), 290 F.3d 1140, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2002); Petralia v. Jercich (In re
Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 2001); Murray v. Bammer (In ye Bammer), 131 F.3d 788 (9th Cir.
1997); Suarez v. Barrett (In re Suarez), 400 B.R. 732 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2009); Maaskant v. Peck (In re Peck),
295 B.R. 353 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2003); Thiara v. Spycher Brothers (In re Thiara), 285 B.R. 420, 433 (9th
Cir. B.A.P. 2002); Nahman v. Jacks (In re Jacks), 266 B.R. 728, 743 (9th Cir. BA.P. 2001). The fifth
circuit is alone in holding explicitly that "willful and malicious" constitute a unitary standard. Miller v. J.D.
Abrams Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 1998). The fourth, eighth and tenth circuits appear to
have not-quite explicitly adopted a standard for malice that is subsumed by willfulness as defined in Geiger.
The fourth circuit has not considered malice since Geiger, but in its most recent consideration of the
subject, stated that "malice" entails "a subjective, knowing disregard of the creditor's rights." St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Vaughn (In re Vaughn), 779 F.2d 1003 (4th Cir. 1985); Hagan v. McNallen (In re
McNallen), 62 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 1995); Maryland v. Stanley (In re Stanley), 66 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 1995).
The tenth circuit has stated that "'malicious' requires proof 'that the debtor either intend the resulting
injury or intentionally take action that is substantially certain to cause the injury.'" Dort, Bentley &
Pecha, CPAs, P.C. v Pasek (In re Pasek), 983 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir. 1993); Panalis v. Moore (In re Moore),
357 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 2004). The eight circuit states that conduct is malicious when it is "'targeted at
the creditor . . . at least in the sense that the conduct is certain or almost certain to cause . . . harm to the
creditor." This standard evolved from a standard that required special malice, but this current formulation
includes an alternative to special malice that is subsumed by the willfulness standard of Geiger. See Sells v.
Porter (In re Porter), 539 F.3d 889, 894 (8th Cir. 2008); Siemer v. Nangle (In re Nangle), 274 F.3d 481,
484 (8th Cir. 2001); Hobson Mould Works, Inc. v. Madsen (In re Madsen), 195 F.3d 988, 989 (1999);
Fischer v. Scarborough (In re Scarborough), 171 F.3d 638, 641 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 931
(1999); Waugh v. Eldridge (In re Waugh), 95 F.3d 706, 711 (8th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Miera (In re
Miera), 926 F.2d 741, 743-44 (8th Cir. 1991); Barclays Am. Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Long (In re Long), 774
F.2d 875, 881 (8th Cir. 1985); Jamrose v. D'Amato (In re D'Amato), 341 B.R. 1, 4-5 (8th Cir. B.A.P.
2006); Osborne v. Stage (In re Stage), 321 B.R. 486, 493 (8th B.A.P. 2005); Johnson v. Fors (In re Fors),
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3. The Legislative History of Section 523(a)(6) as it Relates to
Contract Claims
The legislative history of the various versions of the "willful and mali-
cious injury" exception to the discharge over the course of the history of
American bankruptcy law sheds scant light on the question whether the stat-
ute covers claims for breach of contract. The exception was first enacted as
§ 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,52 and there was no explanation of
the provision in the accompanying Congressional report.53 The Bankruptcy
Act of 1978 (the Code) incorporated the willful and malicious injury excep-
tion without any substantive changes to the text of § 17a(2).54 The Con-
gressional reports accompanying the Code state that the enactment of
§ 523(a)(6) abrogated pre-Code law regarding the meaning of "willfulness,"55
but did not touch on whether the exception applied to contract claims or was
limited to tort claims. As discussed in more detail below,56 the absence of any
259 B.R. 131, 136 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 2001); Johnson v. Logue (In re Logue), 294 B.R. 59, 63 (8th Cir. B.A.P.
2003).
"Section 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided, in relevant part: "a discharge in bankruptcy
shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts, except such as ... (2) are judgments . .. for willful and
malicious injuries to the person or property of another." An Act to establish a uniform system of bank-
ruptcy throughout the United States, ch. 541, § 17a(2), 30 Stat. 544, 550 (repealed 1978).
s"See H. REP. No. at 65, 55th Cong., 2d Sess. (accompanying S. 1035) (Dec. 16, 1897).
54The enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 was preceded by extensive study and debate. In
1970, Congress established a Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. Act of July 24,
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468. In 1973, the Commission issued its report, including a draft
statute. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pts. I & II, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (hereinafter the Commission
Report). The Commission proposed no substantive changes to the willful and malicious injury exception
as it existed under § 17a of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The Commission bill, § 506(a)(7), reversed a
1970 amendment, Act of Oct. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467, 84 Stat. 992, by reincorporating the willful
and malicious conversion exception into the general willful and malicious injury provision. H.R. Doc. No.
93-137, pt. II, at 136, 139-40. Congress incorporated the exception in the Code essentially as drafted by
the Commission. See generally Charles Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral
Conversions and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 56, 61-78 (1990) (recounting a
detailed and careful history of the willful and malicious injury exception and its adoption in the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1978). Congress considered bills drafted by the Commission, the National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges and the National Bankruptcy Conference. All three of these bills used the Commission
text of the exception, which obviously was derived from § 17a(2). The bill considered by the Senate in
1977 was phrased a bit differently than the House bill; it sought to reincorporate willful and malicious
conversions into the general willful and malicious injury exception by specifically referring to "conversion."
S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 36091 (1977). While the final statute did not include the
Senate bill reference to "conversion," the floor managers stated that the exception still covered willful and
malicious conversions. 124 CONG. REc. H32399 (Sept. 28, 1978).
"The House Report states that "[u]nder this paragraph, 'willful' means deliberate or intentional. To
the extent that Tinker held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have
relied on Tinker to apply a 'reckless disregard' standard, they are overruled." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, p.
365 (1977), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News pp. 5963, 6320. The Senate report included a nearly
identical statement. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 79 (1978), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 5787,
5864.
s
6 See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
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other comment regarding the scope of the exception arguably supports the
inference that Congress intended to ratify pre-Code case law that generally
(but not uniformly) limited the exception to tortious conduct.
III. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS SPLIT ON TORTIOUS
CONDUCT AS WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS INJURY
The circuit courts of appeal are split on whether contract claims can be
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) when the debtor has not also acted tor-
tiously. As one commentator has observed, "[a]bsent a decision of the Su-
preme Court or an amendment to § 523(a)(6), uniformity in this area of
bankruptcy law is unlikely in the foreseeable future."57 The ninth circuit has
held that § 523(a)(6) requires tortious conduct.58 On the other hand, the
fifth59 and tenth60 circuits have ruled that contract claims may be nondis-
57Neil Berman, When is an Intentional Breach of Contract Nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6)?, NOR,
TON BANKRUPTCY LAW ADVISOR 13 (Thomson Reuters/West Dec. 2008).
5 Lockerby v. Sierra, 535 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that debt for nonpayment of commissions
under employment contract was nondischargeable where the breach was also tortious under California
law); Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a knowing breach of a
contact constitutes a nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(6) if the breach was tortious even if there was
no tort apart from the breach); Del Bino v. Bailey (In re Bailey), 197 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that
debt was dischargeable where debtor's conduct did not constitute conversion under California law). See
also Snoke v. Riso (In re Riso), 978 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a right of first refusal is not
property within the meaning of § 523(a)(6), so that the debtor's breach of the agreement did not consti-
tute a nondischargeable liability; and stating that "[i]t is well settled that a simple breach of contract is not
the type of injury addressed by § 523(a)(6)," and that "[a]n intentional breach of contract is excepted
from discharge under § 523(a)(6) only when it is accompanied by malicious and willful tortious conduct.").
Cf Banks v. Gill Distribution Centers, Inc., 263 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a fraud claim was
for willful and malicious injury, however, the only fraud was that the debtor failed to pay the plaintiff his
portion of a law suit recovery with the purpose either to extract an agreement to accept substantially less
than the promised payment, or to delay payment until after the statute of limitations had run so as to
avoid payment altogether).
s"Williams v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 520, 337 F.3d 504, 510 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that a
claim for breach of contract can be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), but holding that on the facts of the
case, the plaintiff labor union (as distinct from its members) did not suffer a willful and malicious injury).
'Sanders v. Vaughn (In re Sanders), 210 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion). In Sanders,
the court of appeals affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision that the plaintiffs contract claim was nondis-
chargeable under § 523(a)(6). The debtor had hired the plaintiff attorney on a contingency fee basis to
seek a tax refund from the IRS. The contract gave the plaintiff a power of attorney and stipulated that tax
refund checks would be sent to the plaintiff. The debtor thereafter wrote a letter to the IRS revoking the
power of attorney and directing that the refund check be sent to him. In this way, the bankruptcy court
said, the debtor "beat [the plaintiff] out of the fee." Id. at 390. See also Dorr, Bentley & Pecha, CPAs, PC
v. Pasek (In re Pasek), 983 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir. 1993) (indicating that contract claim for breach of
covenant not to compete could be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), while affirming the lower court
decisions that on the facts of the case the injury was not willful and malicious where the debtor acted with
just cause or excuse because the plaintiff had sought to materially alter the partnership agreement by
regulating aspects of the debtor's personal and family life and imposing an unreasonable billable hour quota
on the debtor, and further because the debtor reasonably relied on a legal opinion that the covenant not to
compete was not enforceable). Accord, Berger v. Buck (In re Buck), 220 B.R. 999, 1004-05 (10th Cir.
B.A.P. 1998) (assuming that contract claims are within the scope of § 523(a)(6), while holding that on the
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chargeable under § 523(a)(6), although in an unpublished decision the fifth
circuit has also held that the statute requires tortious conduct for nondis-
chargeability.6 1 In an unpublished decision, the sixth circuit has held that
§ 523(a)(6) does not except from discharge debts for breach of contract.62
However, in an earlier published decision, the sixth circuit bankruptcy appel-
late panel ruled that breach of contract claims may be excepted from dis-
charge for willful and malicious injury.63 In a pre-Geiger decision, the seventh
circuit affirmed a judgment that a claim arising from the breach of a covenant
not to compete was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), but the court did
not address the scope of the exception.64 In an unpublished, post-Geiger deci-
sion, the seventh circuit suggested that § 523(a)(6) covers only intentional
tort claims. 6s
The Appendix contains a detailed review of the circuit court decisions on
whether § 523(a)(6) requires tortious conduct for nondischargeability. It is
the author's view that the decisions holding that § 523(a)(6) requires tor-
tious conduct are wrongly decided. At the same time, the appellate decisions
holding that § 523(a)(6) excepts breach of contract claims either lack reason-
ing or are poorly reasoned.
IV. APPROACHES TO NONDISCHARGEABILITY OF
CONTRACT CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 523(A)(6)
While it is clear that § 523(a)(6) does not cover claims for a simple but
knowing breach of contract, it is far from clear how the terms of the statute
yield this interpretation. The exception addresses culpable misconduct, and
an intentional breach of contract standing alone is not culpable misconduct in
facts of the case the debtor-attorney's breach of a contract with the plaintiff client did not cause a willful
and malicious injury).
"iCotton v. Deasy (In re Deasy), 66 Fed. Appx. 526, 526 (5th Cir. 2003) (unpublished decision)
(holding that Geiger "explicitly rejects a construction of 'willful' under which a breach of contract could
qualify").
6 2Steir v. Best (In re Best), 109 Fed. Appx. 1 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished opinion).
6 3The Spring Works, Inc. v. Sarff (In re Sarff), 242 B.R. 620 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 2000). In Sarff, the
B.A.P. held that a state court judgment for breach of a covenant not to compete, breach of contract, breach
of duty of loyalty, misappropriation of trade secrets, intentional interference with business relations and
discovery sanctions collaterally estopped the debtor to contest nondischargeability of the debt under
§ 523(a)(6). The state court made findings that supported an inference of malice, including that the debtor
had taken springs and customers from the plaintiff, and awarded punitive damages which required malice
as an element. Id. at 625-28. Citing Geiger and Salem Bend Condominium Association v. Bullock-Williams
(In re Bullock-Williams), 220 B.R. 345 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 1998), the court stated that damages for knowing
breach of contract can be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6). Id. at 626.
6 4N.I.S. Corporation v. Hallahan (In re Hallahan), 936 F.2d 1496 (7th Cir. 1991) (unpublished opinion)
(pre-Geiger decision, applying the looser standard for willfulness that Geiger disapproved).
6
"Radivojevic v. Pickens, 234 F.3d 1273 (7th Cir. 2000) (Table), 2000 WL 1071464 at *1 (stating that
523(a)(6) "is intended to prevent the discharge of debts incurred as a result of intentional torts" and that
the plaintiffs "state court judgment is based upon a breach of contract, not an intentional tort.").
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any legal sense. Contract law remedies generally compensate the non-breach-
ing party for loss suffered as a result of the breach, and do not punish the
breaching party as a means to compel performance.66 Indeed, the widely ac-
cepted contract law theory of efficient breach 67 is that contracting parties are
permitted and perhaps encouraged to breach a contract when the gain from
the breach exceeds the cost of compensating the other party for losses result-
ing from the breach.68 Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code itself expressly con-
templates in § 365 the rejection of executory contracts after a case is filed
when that is in the best interest of the bankruptcy estate.69
At the same time, almost all courts, including every circuit court that has
considered the question, have held that "willful" means conduct intended to
cause injury or that the debtor knew was substantially certain to cause in-
jury.70 Because a debtor who knowingly breaches a contract normally knows
that injury is substantially certain to result from the breach, most breaches of
contract could be termed "willful," unless the statute is read to implicitly
exclude at least the garden-variety claims.
Accepting that § 523(a)(6) does not bar the discharge of claims for simple
knowing breach of contract, this Part considers five possible approaches to
interpreting the statute. First, the "willful" prong of § 523(a)(6) arguably
requires actual intent to injure, and does not cover conduct that the debtor
knows is substantially certain to cause injury. Second, several courts have
found that an injury was willful because the debtor knew that the injury was
substantially certain to follow from the breach, but found that the debt was
dischargeable because the injury was not malicious.7' Third, it can be argued
that a contract claim arises when a contract is made, so that the debt can be
for a willful or malicious injury only if the putative debtor had no intent to
perform at the time the contract was made-which is the basis for an inten-
"See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (explaining that "j]udicial remedies under the
rules stated in this Restatement serve to protect one or more of the [expectation, reliance or restitution]
interests of a promisee"); id. at § 355 (providing that "[p]unitive damages are not recoverable for a breach
of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are
recoverable").
67See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 4.9, at 89-90 (2d ed. 1977) (explaining that contract
remedies permit breach of contract where breaching party compensates the other party for the costs of
breach, and ordinarily do not require performance of the contract; and thus contracting parties are free to
breach when it is efficient, i.e., where benefits of the breach outweigh the costs).
6
"See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.3 at 736-37 (4th ed. 2004) (citing cases endors-
ing the theory).
6911 U.S.C. § 365(a). "[Tjhe rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease [generally] consti-
tutes a [prepetition] breach of such contract or lease . . . ." Id. § 365(g).
70See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
7iSee cases cited infra note 83.
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tional tort claim for fraud.72 Fourth, some courts, including several courts of
appeal, have held that § 523(a)(6) implicitly requires tortious conduct.73 Fi-
nally, the thesis of this article is that § 523(a)(6) implicitly requires a volun-
tary and affirmative act, which would exclude the great majority of but not
all claims for knowing breach of contract from the scope of the exception to
discharge. Each of these approaches is discussed in the following subsections.
A. WILLFULNESS REQUIRES SUBJECTIVE INTENT TO INJURE, AND
NOT MERELY KNOWLEDGE THAT INJURY IS SUBSTANTIALLY
CERTAIN
Geiger and § 523(a)(6) can be read to require that the debtor have acted
with the specific purpose to injure the claimant, and not merely with knowl-
edge that injury was substantially certain to result from his conduct. If this
is the correct reading of Geiger, the statute would not apply to except from
discharge the vast majority of contract claims. While a debtor who know-
ingly breaches a contract ordinarily knows that the creditor will suffer injury,
it is rare that a party breaches a contract with the purpose of causing that
injury. Rather, a debtor typically breaches a contract for reasons that are not
motivated to cause harm to the creditor-the debtor breaches unintention-
ally, because it is thought to be economically efficient, or because he is unable
to perform.
In Geiger, the Court held that § 523(a)(6) does not apply to debts for
negligent or reckless injuries, ruling that the statute applies to "acts done
with the actual intent to cause injury."74 Thus, this language in Geiger can
readily be interpreted to require that "willfulness" presupposes a subjective
purpose to cause injury, and that it is not enough that the debtor knew that
injury was substantially certain to result. The dictum in Geiger regarding
contract claims75 arguably reinforces this interpretation of the Court's hold-
ing. In dismissing claims for knowing breach of contract as clearly beyond the
scope of § 523(a)(6), the Court may have assumed that willfulness does not
comprehend conduct that the debtor knows is substantially certain to result
in injury.
The Supreme Court in Geiger relied on the Restatement (Second) of
Torts' definition of intent in holding that § 523(a)(6) does not apply to torts
"See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530 (stating that "[a] representation of the maker's own
intention to do or not do a particular thing is fraudulent if he does not have that intention").
"See cases cited infra notes 97-98.
74Geiger, 523 U.S. at 61. It is beyond the scope of this article to develop all of the doctrinal, policy and
theoretical arguments regarding what constitutes "willfulness." Suffice it to say that at this point, it is
firmly established that "willful injury" includes an injury that the debtor did not desire but which the
debtor knew was substantially certain to result from his conduct.
"Id. at 62.
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for negligent or reckless conduct. 76 The Restatement defines the term intent
to cover both acts undertaken with the purpose of causing injury and acts
undertaken with knowledge that injury is substantially certain to result.77
Moreover, the decision by the eighth circuit in Geiger, which the Supreme
Court affirmed, did define intent in the broader sense.78 The great majority
of post-Geiger decisions on the question, including every appellate level deci-
sion to address it, have held that the willfulness prong of § 523(a)(6) is satis-
fied if the debtor believed that harm was certain or substantially certain to
result from his conduct.79
B. THE MALICIOUS PRONG OF § 523(A)(6) EXCLUDES MOST BREACH
OF CONTRACT CLAIMS
As discussed above, the prevailing definition of malice, derived from
Tinker v. Colwell, is that malice entails conduct that is wrongful and without
just cause or excuse.80 On both counts, a simple knowing breach of a con-
tract ordinarily should not be viewed as giving rise to a malicious injury.
First, a breach of a contract is rarely wrongful in any legal sense.8 ' Second,
there is "just cause or excuse" for a knowing breach of contract where the
debtor lacks the ability to pay obligations, and thus defaults, albeit intention-
ally, on some or all of them. Although a breach could be wrongful where the
debtor acted negligently or recklessly in performing a contract, such conduct
would not be willful.82
Thus, although a simple knowing breach of contract is willful, it is rare
that it will be malicious. There are a few decisions in which courts have
found that a contract claim was for willful but not malicious injury.83 How-
76Id. at 61-62.
77RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b.
7
'Geiger v. Kawaauhau (In re Geiger), 113 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1997), affd, 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
79See discussion supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text. There is limited support for the narrower
view of intent to injure. See Rescuecom Corp. v. Khafaga (In re Khafaga), 419 B.R. 539, 549 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2009) (reviewing cases). In Cadillac Vending Co. v. Haynes (In re Haynes), 19 B.R. 849 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1982), which was decided shortly after the enactment of the Code and well before Geiger, the
debtor breached a contract with the plaintiff so that he could enter into a more financially advantageous
contract with another lessor of vending machines and game tables. The court stated that "whatever
interpretation the cases appear to support, it is amply clear that a debt arising out of a mere breach of
contract absent any showing that the purpose of the breach was to cause injury is not a non-dischargeable
debt within the meaning of § 523(a)(6)." Id. at 851. The court concluded that the debt was dischargeable,
explaining that "[t]he debtor did not terminate the contract to cause injury to [the plaintiff]. The debtor
terminated the contract to enhance his own economic interest." Id. at 852. The Haynes court is in the
sixth circuit, which has adopted the broader view of intent. See cases cited supra note 41.
soSee supra note 51 and accompanying text.
"See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
8'See Geiger, 523 U.S. at 62. See also infra notes 183-89 and accompanying text (describing the con-
struction contract cases).
'3In Wish Acquisition, LLC v. Salvino, 2008 WL 182241 (D. N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008), affg, 373 B.R.
578 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007), the district court agreed with the bankruptcy court's conclusion that
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ever, where a breach of contract is knowing and voluntary, it is at least argu-
able that it is "without just cause or excuse." The decisions in which the
courts held that a breach of contract claim was for willful but not malicious
injury do not appear to have involved efficient breaches.84
Further, Geiger provides indirect support for the conclusion that contract
claims generally are dischargeable under § 523(a)(6) because the breach typi-
cally is not willful. Geiger appears to address only the willful prong of the
statute, and in rejecting the claimants' argument that the exception extends
to deliberate acts that cause injury, the Court explained that such a broad
interpretation would inappropriately extend the exception to a wide range of
cases, including claims for knowing breach of contract.85
§ 523(a)(6) requires tortious conduct. In addition, the court noted that willful and malicious are distinct
inquiries, and stated that "[a]n intentional breach of contract is certainly willful, but it need not be
malicious." Id. at *4. In elaborating the point, the district court wrote:
The vast majority of contracts are entered into for reasons of pecuniary gain, and
the foreseeable consequences of breach are also pecuniary. Thus, a party may inten-
tionally breach a contract with the knowledge that an injury may result, but the
nature of the injury is in large part foreseeable, and, more importantly, assumed by
both parties as part of the risk, or cost, of doing business. The injury is real, but it
is not 'malicious' in the sense that it deserves exception from discharge under the
Bankruptcy Code. This is especially true in light of the general rule that exceptions
to discharge should be narrowly construed, in order to effectuate the mostly-still-
intact congressional policy of permitting bankrupts a fresh start. [citation omitted]
Without the tortious conduct requirement, the exception under § 523(a)(6) would
be unduly expanded and the opportunity for a fresh start would be thwarted. A
primary purpose of bankruptcy legislation is to 'relieve the honest debtor from the
weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the
obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes. [citation
omitted] This purpose would be frustrated if debt incurred as the result of busi-
ness judgment rose to the level of intentional injury within the meaning of
§ 523(a)(6). Something more must be required. For these reasons, I find that a
debt arising from an intentional breach of contract standing alone is insufficient to
except a debt from discharge. Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court's finding that tor-
tious conduct is an essential element of a 'willful and malicious' injury under
§ 523(a)(6) is affirmed.
Id. The court's reasoning is not entirely coherent. The court indicates that an intentional breach of
contract is "willful," but not necessarily malicious, and also states that tortious conduct is an essential
element of the exception. The latter does not necessarily follow from the former, as malicious might
encompass more than tortious. See also Wickes Lumber Co. v. Magee (In re Magee), 164 B.R. 530, 538
(Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1994) (holding that debt for construction materials was for willful but not malicious
injury; the debtor builder purchased the materials on credit, and failed to use his construction loan to pay
for the materials although he executed affidavits to the construction lender representing that there were
no unpaid claims for materials); Goodstein Realty Boca Raton, LLC v. Gelinas (In re Gelinas), 2007 WL
2965046 at *9 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2007) (finding that "a debt arising from a breach of contract
standing alone is insufficient to except a debt from discharge for willful and malicious injury. Plaintiffs
argument that Defendants necessarily knew or were substantially certain that their breach of contract
would cause injury to Plaintiff may establish the 'willful' prong but it does not establish malice.").
84See supra note 67 (defining "efficient breach").
85S23 U.S. at 62.
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C. A CONTRACT CLAIM ARISES AT THE TIME THE CONTRACT WAS
MADE
Section 523(a)(6) should not apply to breach of contract claims if such
claims are said to arise when the contract was made and not when it is
breached. This approach, based on the Code's definition of "claim," distin-
guishes between claim and cause of action. Section 523(a)(6) excepts from
discharge "any debt . . . for willful and malicious injury."8 6 The Code defines
"debt" as "liability on a claim."87 And "claim" means "right to payment,
whether or not such right is . . . liquidated, . . . contingent, [or] . . . unma-
tured."88 Unlike tort claims, where the claim and the cause of action are
almost invariably one and the same, a contract claim arises at the time the
contract was made, while a cause of action in contract arises if and when
there is a breach. In other words, a claim, albeit contingent and perhaps
unliquidated and unmatured, arises at the time a contract is made. Certainly,
the non-debtor party to a contract has a claim in bankruptcy regardless of
whether the debtor has breached the contract, and the claim exists indepen-
dent of any cause of action for breach under non-bankruptcy law.8 9 That
claim could be for willful and malicious injury only if the debtor made the
contract with the intent not to perform it, in which case, the other party may
have a claim in tort for fraud, an intentional tort, which would be excepted
from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A).90
This line of reasoning is consistent with the dicta in Geiger. There, the
Court appears to have assumed that contract claims, like negligence claims,
are categorically beyond the scope of § 523(a)(6).91 Moreover, this approach
8611 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
s7Id. § 101(12).
8Id. § 101(5).
"The court in Cadillac Vending Co. v. Haynes (In re Haynes), 19 BR. 849 (Bankr.E.D. Mich. 1982),
hinted at this point, although it did not distinguish between claim and cause of action. In explaining that a
claim for "mere breach of contract" was dischargeable, the court stated that "[tlhe vast majority of con-
tracts are entered into for reasons of pecuniary gain, and the foreseeable consequences of breach are also
pecuniary. Thus, a party may intentionally breach a contract with knowledge that an injury may result,
but the nature of the injury is in large part foreseeable and assumed as part of the risk of doing business.
The injury is real, but it is not 'malicious' in the sense that it deserved exception from discharge . . . ." Id.
at 852.
'll U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) ("A discharge . . .does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . .
to the extent obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud"). See, e.g., Palmacci v.
Umpierrez, 121 F.3d 781,786-88 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that "[i]f, at the time he made his promise, the
debtor did not intend to perfonn, then he has made a false representation (false as to his intent) and the
debt that arose as a result thereof is not dischargeable (if the other elements of § S23(a)(2)(A) are met)");
Rubin v. West (In re Rubin), 875 F.2d 755, 759 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding debt nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(2)(A) where debtor made a promise that he did not intend to perform); Lewis v. Lowery (In re
Lowery), 440 B.R. 914, 924-25 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010) (holding debt nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(2)(A) where debtor lacked subjective intent to perform promise at time he made it).
91Geiger, 523 U.S. at 62.
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does not require any interpretive gloss, such as an implicit requirement of
tortious conduct or an affirmative act. It might also explain why contract
claims are not covered by the exception, but many other non-tort claims, such
as litigation sanctions or debts for contempt of court or violation of a court
order are covered. As discussed below, the courts that hold that § 523(a)(6)
requires tortious conduct apparently overlook that many non-contract, non-
tort claims that are frequently and unremarkably excepted from discharge
under the exception.92 In these cases, the claim and the cause of action are
almost invariably synonymous.
This approach proves to be flawed, however. Although a contingent
claim does arise when a contract is made, before and regardless of whether
the debtor ultimately breaches, a claim within the meaning of § 101(5) also
arises upon breach of the contract. There is no reason in law or logic that a
claim does not arise upon breach because there was a claim upon formation of
the contract. Thus, the Code provides that a trustee may assume an execu-
tory contract,93 and the breach or rejection of a contract that has been as-
sumed will be a postpetition obligation and likely an administrative
expense.94 Likewise, the trustee may reject an executory contract,95 in which
case the claim is treated as if it had arisen immediately before the filing.96 In
neither case is the claim regarded as dating to the time that the contract was
originally made. Not surprisingly, it does not appear that any court has con-
sidered this approach.
D. TORTIOUS CONDUCT IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT FOR
NONDISCHARGEABILITY UNDER SECTION 523(a)(6)
A number of courts have held or stated that § 523(a)(6) requires tortious
conduct for nondischargeability.9 7 These courts find support for their con-
92See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
9ll U.S.C. § 365(a).
941d. at § 503(b), § 3 65(g)(2 ).
9
sId. at § 365(a).
96Id. at §§ 365(g)(1), 502(g)(1).
971n addition to the cases cited supra notes 58, 61 and 65, the following cases hold or state, with little
or no discussion, that § 523(a)(6) requires tortious conduct: Sandow v. Burke (In re Burke), 416 B.R. 136,
144 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009) (stating that "[a] claim . .. for breach of an oral promise does not constitute an
intentional tort and thus does not establish willful and malicious injury"); Woo, Inc. v. Donelson (In re
Donelson), 410 B.R. 495, 505 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (stating that "[piroof of debt based on a 'knowing
breach of contract' is insufficient under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) . . . [plaintiffs] debt arises solely from a
breach of contract . . . [and plaintiff] has failed to prove that her debt should be excepted from discharge.");
Prewett v. Iberg (In te Iberg), 395 B.R. 83, 90 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2008) (holding that claim for breach of
construction contract was dischargeable under § 523(a)(6), although the construction work "revealed the
most blatant disregard for [the plaintiffs] physical safety and financial waste" that an inspector had ever
seen, the court found that the debtor's performance was incompetent but not willful and malicious);
A.K.D., Inc. v. Treon (In re Treon), 2008 WL 65575 at *3-6 (Bankr. D. Or. Jan. 4, 2008) (holding that
debtor did not commit the independent tort of intentional interference with economic relations, and there-
(Vol. 88
2014) WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS INJURY 195
clusion in the context of the statute; the policies underlying the discharge and
the willful and malicious injury exception to the discharge; the common un-
derstanding of "willful and malicious" as associated with intentional torts; and
the interpretation of the exception under pre-Code case law.98 These ratio-
nales are considered in turn.
1. The Context of Section 523(a)(6)
Courts that hold that § 523(a)(6) requires tortious conduct point to
§ 365(a), which authorizes the rejection of executory contracts and
unexpired leases.99 The underlying principle is the maximization of the value
of the bankruptcy estate; if the contract is not profitable, it should be re-
jected. Rejection gives rise to a prepetition unsecured claim that will be dis-
charged to the extent that it is not paid.100 An interpretation of § 523(a)(6)
that prevents the discharge of claims for knowing breach of contract is incon-
sistent with the provisions in § 365 that expressly authorize the intentional
breach of executory contracts and unexpired leases. 01
While § 365 manifestly conflicts with the conclusion that claims for mere
knowing breach of contract are nondischargeable, it does not necessarily fol-
low that § 523(a)(6) requires tortious conduct. As long as § 523(a)(6) in
fore the debt was dischargeable); Grobel v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 2007 WL 5065545 at *3-4 (Bankr. D.
Minn. Nov. 14, 2007) (discharging contract claim where plaintiff transferred his accounting business in
exchange for debtor's promise to pay the purchase price in installments, but did not take a security interest
in the business or its assets to secure the purchase price; debtor made just a few payments, and then sold
the business to a third party and spent the funds); Neiman v. Irmen (In re Irmen), 379 B.R. 299, 313
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007) (indicating that the debt could be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) where the
plaintiff pleaded that the contract had been induced by misrepresentation); Gabel v. Olson (In re Olson),
355 B.R. 660, 665-66 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006) (asserting a contract claim was not nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(6) where debtor failed to make payments to the plaintiff under a partnership agreement); Donald-
son v. Hayes (In re Hayes), 315 B.R. 579, 590 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2004); Legendary Leasing v. Glatt (In re
Glatt), 315 B.R. 501, 511 (Bankr. D. N.D. 2004); Cutler v. Lazzara (In re Lazzara), 287 B.R. 714, 722-23
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002); Baltimore County Savings Bank v. Malinowski (In re Malinowski), 249 B.R. 672,
675 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000) (stating that § 523(a)(6) "relates to tortious conduct and not to mere breaches
of contract"); Spinoso v. Heilman (In re Heilman), 241 B.R. 137, 172 (Bankr. D. Md. 1999); Clarks Deliv-
ery, Inc. v. Moultrie (In re Moultrie), 51 B.R. 368, 373 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1985); Creditthrift of Am.,
Inc. v. Howard (In re Howard), 6 B.R. 256, 258 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980) (stating that "[t]he exception to
discharge in § 523(a)(6) sounds in tort, not breach of contract.") See also Tari v. Huggins (In re Huggins),
252 B.R. 567, 569 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000) (holding that claim for breaches under lease agreement were
not nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), reasoning that "[i]t is abundantly clear that the claim of nondis-
chargeability is a claim for breach of contract."); Lytle v. Abraham (In re Abraham), 247 B.R. 479, 484
(Bankr. D. Kan. 2000) (holding that claim for simple breach of contract was not nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(6)).
9
8See generally Wish Acquisition, LLC v. Salvino (In re Salvino), 373 B.R. 578, 589-91 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
2007), affd, 2008 WL 182241 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008).
911 U.S.C. § 365(a).
1-Id. § 365(g)(1), § 502(g)(1).
'See Lockerby v. Sierra, 535 F.3d 1038, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2008); In re Salvino, 373 B.R. at 589-91;
Palazzolo v. Colclazier (In re Colclazier), 134 B.R. 29, 33 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1991); In re Haynes, 19 B.R.
at 852-53.
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some way effectively distinguishes between debts for simple knowing
breaches of contract and debts for breaches involving culpable misconduct,
there is no inconsistency between the exception and the Code provisions for
rejection of executory contracts.
Although most breaches of contract do not entail culpable misconduct, a
breach can be culpable, although not necessarily tortious. Consider, for exam-
ple, the breach of a covenant not to compete. 102 The knowing breach of a
covenant by competing with the other party in a way that the debtor knows
will cause injury is no less wrongful than tortiously interfering with a con-
tract with knowledge that the interference will cause injury. The latter
claim is clearly within the scope of § 523(a)(6). 0 3
2. The Policies Underlying the Discharge and the Section 523(a)(6)
Exception to the Discharge
Courts that require tortious conduct for nondischargeability under
§ 523(a)(6) also rely on the policies underlying the discharge and the excep-
tion. The policy underlying the discharge is to "relieve the honest debtor
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh
free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business mis-
fortunes."I0 4 The policy underlying § 523(a)(6), along with several of the
other exceptions to the discharge,105 is to limit the scope of the discharge to
debts that are not incurred through culpable misconduct by the debtor. 0 6
Relatedly, it is well-established that the various exceptions to discharge are
to be interpreted narrowly so as to advance the fresh start policy.1o 7 This
maxim supports a narrow reading of § 523(a)(6) that excludes claims for
breach of contract.108
'o
2See infra notes 147-63 and accompanying text.
ioSee, e.g., National Sign & Signal v. Livingston, 422 B.R. 645, (D. W.D. Mich. 2009); Kymn, Inc. v.
Langeslag (In re Langeslag), 366 B.R. 51 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2007); Rainbird Corporation v. Milton (In re
Milton), 355 B.R. 575 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2006). Moreover, as discussed infra notes 164-68 and accompa-
nying text, § 365 may not apply to covenants not to compete.
04Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). See also Wish Acquisition, LLC v. Salvino (In re
Salvino), 373 B.R. 578, 591 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007), affd, 2008 WL 182241 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008);
Palazzolo v. Colclazier (In re Colclazier), 134 B.R. 29, 32-33 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1991); Communications
Workers of America, Local No. 11500 v. Akridge (In re Akridge), 71 B.R. 151, 154 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987)
(observing that "[d]ebtors routinely breach contracts since they lack the financial resources to perform.
Further, many contracts are breached by their terms upon the debtor's insolvency or upon the filing of the
petition. Chapter 7 debtors in particular are often burdened by onerous contracts and need to reject them.
If intentionally breached contracts were held to create nondischargeable debts, few debtors could ever get
a fresh start. Charge card debt, bank loans, mortgages, car loans and household finance loans would all be
routinely nondischargeable.").
05See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
iO'Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991).
0 7oSee Ceiger, 523 U.S. at 62; Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915).
iosGeiger, 523 U.S. at 61 (quoting Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915) (explaining that an
interpretation of § 523(a)(6) that encompassed intentional acts that cause injury, which could include
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Courts that adhere to this view reason that, if claims for knowing breach
of contract are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), the scope of the fresh
start will be dramatically curtailed. 0 9 The Supreme Court recognized this
point in Geiger when it observed that excepting claims for intentional breach
of contract from the discharge would greatly expand the category of nondis-
chargeable debts.1xo Moreover, given that the promisor's intent is irrelevant
in a breach of contract action, and that the law of contracts appears to sanc-
tion if not encourage efficient (and intentional) breach, excepting claims for
knowing breach of contract would bring within the exception debts that did
not entail any misconduct by the debtor.11 An intentional breach of con-
tract is simply not viewed as legally culpable, dishonest or wrongful. Thus,
punitive damages are not available in actions for breach of contract, except
when the breach amounts to an independent tort.' 12
Like the context argument, the policy argument assumes that if
§ 523(a)(6) does not require tortious conduct, virtually all debts for knowing
breach of contract would be potentially nondischargeable. Again, this view
fails to take into account whether the "willful and malicious" prerequisites for
nondischargeability can distinguish the ordinary from the opprobrious breach
of contract without requiring tortious conduct. A reading of § 523(a)(6) that
both discharges debts for routine knowing breach of contract and excepts
from discharge debts for culpable misconduct more fully serves the policies
underlying both the discharge and the misconduct exceptions to the
discharge.
3. The Common Understanding of "Willful and Malicious"
As the Supreme Court stated in Geiger, "willful and malicious injury"
"triggers in the lawyer's mind the category 'intentional torts.""'" Whereas
claims for knowing breach of contract, "would be incompatible with the 'well-known' guide that excep-
tions to discharge 'should be confined to those plainly expressed.")); Cotton v. Deasy (In re Deasy), 66 Fed.
Appx. 526, 526 (5th Cir. 2003) (unpublished opinion); Palazzolo v. Colclazier (In re Colclazier), 134 B.R.
29, 32-33 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1991) (explaining how the court does not want to extend discharging debts
for intentional breach of contract).
'o
9 See, e.g., Cloyd v. GRP Records, 238 BR. 328, 336 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (asserting that "[i]f
taken to its logical conclusion, [plaintiffs] novel assertion [that its claim for breach of contract was nondis-
chargeable] implies that all bankruptcy petitions could give rise to claims for willful and malicious
injury. . . .").
nioGeiger, 523 U.S. at 61.
"iiSee Lockerby v. Sierra, 535 F.3d 1038, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2008); Wish Acquisition, LLC v. Salvino
(In re Salvino), 373 BR. 578, 590 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007) (explaining that "treating breaches of contracts as
willful and malicious injuries would ... dramatically expand the number of nondischargeable debts and
diminish the scope of the bankruptcy discharge."); Cadillac Vending Co. v. Haynes (In re Haynes), 19 B.R.
849, 852 (1982) (holding that debts "incurred as the result of a business judgment constitute an intentional
injury to property within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) would frustrate this purpose").
"
2 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981).
"'Geiger, 523 U.S. at 61.
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liability for an intentional tort depends on the alleged tortfeasor's state of
mind, the breaching party's state of mind is irrelevant in an action for breach
of contract.114 Likewise, willfulness and malice are commonly required for an
award of punitive damages in a tort action, whereas punitive damages are not
permitted in contract actions except when the breach is accompanied by tor-
tious or egregious conduct.115 In Lockerby v. Sierra, the ninth circuit ex-
plained the point this way:
This approach [of requiring tortious conduct] is consistent
with basic principles of tort and contract law. Historically,
injuries resulting from breaches of contract are treated very
differently from injuries resulting from torts. In contract
law, "[t]he motive for the breach commonly is immaterial in
an action on the contract." . . . The concept of "efficient
breach" is built into our system of contracts, with the under-
standing that people will sometimes intentionally break their
contracts for no other reason that that it benefits them fi-
nancially. The definition of intent to injure as the commis-
sion of an act "substantially certain" to cause harm was born
from tort principles, not contract law principles.11 6
As discussed more fully in the Part IV.E.2 below, this contention equally
well supports the conclusion that tort principles should guide the interpreta-
tion of § 523(a)(6) but do not categorically exclude non-tort based claims
from the ambit of the exception." 7
4. Pre-Code Practice
Finally, courts that hold that tortious conduct is an essential element for
nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6) have found support in pre-Code case
law. The majority of courts applying the "willful and malicious injury" ex-
ception under the former Bankruptcy Act held debts to be nondischargeable
only when the debtor had acted tortiously, even if the language in some of
the opinions indicated that claims for willful breach of contract were ex-
cepted from discharge by the statute." 8 Congress is presumed to have
"
4 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch. 16, introductory cmt. (1981) ("[w]illful,
breaches have not been distinguished from other breaches, [and] punitive damages have not been awarded
for breach of contract.").
"'See Wish Acquisition, LLC v. Salvino (In re Salvino), 373 B.R. 578, 589 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 2007),
affd, 2008 WL 182241 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008) (citing William Prosser, The Law of Torts § 2 at 9-10
(4th ed. 1971), the edition in use at the time the Code was enacted in 1978).
"'6535 F. 3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2008).
"
7 See infra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
"'See Barbachano v. Allen, 192 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 1951); Gafni v. Barton (In re Barton), 465
F.Supp. 918, 924 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1979) (describing how "[m]any earlier decisions under [section 17a(8) of the
former Bankruptcy Act] . . . have limited its application to cases sounding in tort, not in contract.");
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known the connotation of "willful and malicious" when it reenacted the will-
ful and malicious injury exception in the current Code. Thus, in reenacting
the exception without any substantive change, it can be inferred that Con-
gress intended to continue the pre-Code practice of limiting the exception to
debts arising from tortious conduct.119
This last contention is debatable, however. In actuality, there were some
decisions under the Act holding that breach of contract claims were nondis-
chargeable under § 17a(2).120 Courts that held that the exception required
tortious conduct sometimes acknowledged that there was contradictory au-
thority or that the requirement may not be categorical.121
E. "WILLFULNESS" REQUIRES CONDUCT THAT IS VOLUNTARY AND
AFFIRMATIVE AS WELL As DELIBERATE AND INTENTIONAL
An interpretation of "willful" that requires voluntary and affirmative as
well as deliberate and intentional conduct is consistent with the text of
§ 523(a)(6) and the holding and dicta in Geiger. This construction incorpo-
Cadillac Vending Co. v. Haynes (In re Haynes), 19 BR. 849, 850 (1982) (surveying pre-Code cases,
stating that "[s]ection 17(a)(8), from which section 523(a)(6) was derived, has generally been held to cover
liabilities attributable to tortious conduct of the debtor"); Holder v. Brazington (In re Brazington), 3 B.R.
309, 311 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1980) (applying § 17(a)(8) of the former Bankruptcy Act, stating that "[tlhe
majority of the case law also holds that Section 17a(8) refers only to actions in tort."). But see cases cited
infra note 120.
"'iSee Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, (2010); Wish Acquisition, LLC v. Salvino (In re Salvino),
373 B.R. 578, 589-90 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007).
1
20 See, e.g., Nat'l Homes Corp. v. Lester Industries, Inc., 336 F.Supp. 644, 647 (D.W.D.Va. 1972)
(stating that debts may be nondischargeable under the willful and malicious injury exception regardless of
whether they sound in tort or in contract, however, the case apparently involved an independent willful
tort). See also Rivera v. Moore-McCormack, 238 F. Supp. 233, 234 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1965) (stating that -[a]n
act may be ... the result of willfulness and malice. This is an issue to be resolved before dischargeability is
determined, and the theory of recovery - tort or contract - is immaterial.").
Rivera has been repeatedly cited for the proposition that contract claims may be nondischargeable
under the willful and malicious injury exception. However, this statement of the rule seems to conflate the
basis for a prior state court judgment (in Rivera, the plaintiff had obtained a judgment in state court for
breach of contract) with whether there is not also a tort basis for liability that need not be asserted unless
and until the debtor files for bankruptcy. A seaman had brought a claim against the creditor for injuries he
suffered in an altercation with the debtor. The creditor in turn obtained a judgment against the debtor for
breach of his employment agreement by failing to properly perform his duties. When the debtor thereafter
filed for bankruptcy, the creditor sought to except the debt from the discharge as one for willful and
malicious injury. The better statement of the rule in the case is that, although a state court judgment is
based on contract, when the debtor later files for bankruptcy, the claim will be nondischargeable if it was
for a willful and malicious injury. Here, the claim apparently arose from a battery. Accord, Western
Surety Co. v. Rich, 141 F. Supp. 872, 873 (D. W.D. Okl. 1956) (holding debt nondischargeable where the
creditor, a surety bondsman for the debtor when the debtor was county sheriff, paid a judgment against
the debtor for assault and battery; although the obligation to the plaintiff was in contract, not in tort).
i2iSee, e.g., Gafni v. Barton (In re Barton), 465 F. Supp. 918, 924 (D.C.D.N.Y. 1979) ("Others have
questioned this compartmentalized construction of the section. Yet, it is instructive that decisions holding
liabilities formally grounded in contract nondischargeable by force of § 17(a)(8) have involved, in some
respect, recognizable intentional torts such as are regularly deemed comprehended within the section.").
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rates the intentional tort connotation of the terms, "willful and malicious,"
without categorically excluding non-tort debts from the ambit of the statute.
Further, it serves the policies underlying both the discharge and the
§ 523(a)(6) exception to the discharge to except debts for culpable miscon-
duct. Under this approach, the breach of a contract through affirmative con-
duct that is intended to cause a willful and malicious injury gives rise to a
nondischargeable liability, while simple failure to perform, even when in-
tended to cause harm, does not. In some cases it will be difficult to ascertain
whether the breach was a failure to perform or entails affirmative conduct.
However, the same problem can and does arise with respect to tort claims.
Indeed, it is this uncertain line between acting and failing to act that lies at
the heart of many of the closest cases under § 523(a)(6).12 2
1. Tort principles inform interpretation of Section 523(a)(6)
As the Supreme Court observed in Geiger, "the (a)(6) formulation triggers
in the lawyer's mind the category 'intentional torts,' as distinguished from
negligent or reckless torts."123 At the same time, the statute is not by its
express terms limited to intentional torts, and the Court in Geiger carefully
avoided doing so. It follows that, while tort principles may inform interpreta-
tion of § 523(a)(6), the nondischargeability of a debt is not rigidly confined to
intentional torts. Certainly, not all debts for intentional torts are for willful
and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6). Some intentional torts, for example,
battery and false imprisonment, require an intentional act but may not re-
quire an intent to injure,124 and thus injuries resulting from these torts would
not necessarily be willful for purposes of § 523(a)(6). By a parity of reason-
ing, intentional torts are not the only debts that are nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(6). In other words, the statute requires tort-like conduct, but does
not categorically require conduct that is technically or literally tortious.
2. "Willful Injury" entails voluntary and affirmative conduct
It is well established in the law of torts that liability for an intentional
tort requires a voluntary, affirmative act, and that a failure to act generally
cannot constitute an intentional tort. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
1"See, e.g., Blocker v. Patch (In re Patch), 526 F.3d 1176, 1181-83 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that
debtor's failure to act to protect her son from severe physical abuse by her boyfriend, which ultimately
resulted in the boy's death, was not "willful").
1235 2 3 U.S. at 61.
124See generally Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 ARiz. L. REV.
1061, 1066 (2006) (regarding the tort of battery, "[tihe courts are split on the issue: a substantial group
follows the so-called dual-intent approach, requiring both an intent to contact and an intent to either harm
or offend; another substantial group follows the single-intent approach, requiring only an intent to con-
tact."); id. at 1081 (explaining that false imprisonment is an intentional tort that requires only an intent to
confine, and not an intent to harm the plaintiff). See also id. at 1091 (explaining that liability for trespass
to land, an intentional tort, turns on an intent to enter the lands of another and that the defendant is liable
regardless of whether the entry was mistaken).
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provides: "[t]he word 'act' . . . denote[s] an external manifestation of the
actor's will."' 25 "The Restatement structures analysis of battery and other
trespassory torts1 2 6 by requiring an 'act' of the defendant. . . The term
'act' . . . emphasize[s] a distinction between affirmative deeds on the one hand
and omissions or passive behavior on the other."127 The Restatement refers
only to an act and not to an omission in defining intent.128  Applying these
principles to § 523(a)(6), in requiring an intention to cause injury for nondis-
chargeability under § 523(a)(6), that section of the statute necessarily also
requires that the debtor have acted affirmatively.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Geiger somewhat obscures the aspect of
"willfulness" that contemplates an affirmative act by the debtor. The heart of
the Court's reasoning in Geiger is that "willful" modifies "injury," so that it is
the injury that must be intended; an intentional act that that necessarily
causes injury is not sufficient for nondischargeability.1 29 While an injury can
12'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. a to § 3 (explaining that "the word 'actor' [which is
defined in § 3] is used ... not only in its primary sense of denoting one who acts, but also as denoting one
who deliberately or inadvertently fails to act.").
126A trespassory tort is an intentional tort that is accomplished through physical force and is actiona-
ble regardless of whether the plaintiff suffers physical harm. DAN B. DOBBS THE LAW OF TORTS at 47
(2000).
12 71d. at 62. Dobbs further explains:
Can a defendant be liable for a battery when the defendant does nothing to stop
another's bodily contact with the plaintiff? Analogies from negligence law suggest
that the defendant who has no special relationship with the plaintiff or her attacker
would not be liable for a battery if he merely failed to prevent the attacker from
hitting the plaintiff...
On the other hand, the defendant might be under a duty to protect the plaintiff.
Employers, for example, are under a duty to protect employees from sexual batteries
... If an employer knows that an employee is being sexually battered by another
employee, it is not implausible to say that the employer is also guilty of a battery,
though he has not committed any "act." . . . In practice, however, courts are likely
to think of both kinds of claims as negligence claims turning on reasonableness
rather than battery claims turning upon intent.
Id. at 62-63. Thus, for example, the intentional tort of battery requires an affirmative act. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 14. The comment explains that "[t]here is perhaps no essential reason why, under
the modern law, liability for battery might not be based on inaction . . . . Apparently, however, no such
case has arisen, and what little authority there is denies the liability." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 14 cmt. c. See also In Blocker v. Patch (In re Patch), 526 F.3d 1176, 1181-82 (8th Cir. 2008),
rev'g, 356 B.R. 450 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 2006), where the court, citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, reversed the BAP's holding that the failure to act in the face of a legal duty can constitute an
intentional tort, and "question[ed] whether a debtor's breach of a legal duty can ever constitute a 'willful
.... injury.
i"8See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A and comments (stating that intentionally failing to
act in the face of a legal duty constitutes negligence). Id. § 13, at 24 (stating that "failure to perform [a
duty to protect others] constitutes negligence . . . irrespective of whether his failure is or is not deliberate
and done for the very purpose of causing the other to suffer the bodily harm from which it was the actor's
duty to protect him.").
"9 5 2 3 U.S. at 61.
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be characterized as "willful" - meaning intentional and deliberate-and "ma-
licious" -without excuse - it is inapt to describe an injury as "affirmative."
Manifestly, however, the Court's definition of "willful" in Geiger requires
that the debtor intend both the injury and the act that caused the injury.130
The latter is subsumed within the former, as there can be no intentional
injury in the absence of an intentional act, and accordingly the understanding
that "willful" also requires affirmative conduct is entirely consistent with the
point that "willful" modifies "injury."
There is no basis in the text of § 523(a)(6) to require affirmative conduct
for purposes of excepting a tort debt from the discharge but not a contract
debt. Indeed, reading "willful" to require affirmative conduct recognizes that
a mere failure to perform a contract is not conduct that is sufficiently culpa-
ble to warrant nondischargeability, just as in the law of torts a failure to act
cannot give rise to liability for an intentional tort.
On the other hand, affirmative conduct in the breach of a contract, like
affirmative conduct in the violation of a legal duty in tort, sometimes may
constitute culpable misconduct.131 While the objective of contract remedies
generally is to compensate a party for losses suffered as a result of the
breach,132 and punitive damages are generally disallowed unless the breach is
also a tort for which punitive damages may be awarded,'3 3 it does not follow
that the breach of contract can not entail culpable conduct absent an accom-
panying tort. Section 523(a)(6) does not require that an intentional tort war-
rant punitive damages for nondischargeability. Likewise, there may be
breaches of contract that do not warrant an award of punitive damages, but
which may entail a level of culpability that precludes discharge of the debt.
Just as § 523(a)(6) does not require that an intentional tort committed by the
debtor warrant punitive damages before the debt is nondischargeable, this
article posits that it also does not require that the breach of a contract war-
rant imposition of punitive damages before the debt can be nondischargeable.
Moreover, culpability does not attach to a debtor's conduct that is not
voluntary. If the debtor breaches a contract by failing to pay for goods or
services because he does not have the wherewithal to pay the obligation, the
conduct ordinarily is not culpable. Although in some cases the debtor may
have failed to act prudently in incurring the debt, there is nothing willful
"old. (explaining that "[t]he word 'willful' in (a)(6) modifies the word 'injury,' indicating that nondis-
chargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to
injury"). In stating that nondischargeability entails 'not merely a deliberate or intentional act," the Court
acknowledged that the act, too, must be deliberate and intentional.
i"iSee infra notes 142-89 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts have found debts
for breach of contract to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6)).
132See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981).
13Id. at § 355.
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about nonpayment unless the debtor incurred the debt with the intention of
not repaying it.
3. Section 523(a)(6) covers tort and non-tort debts
If "tortious conduct" is an essential element of § 523(a)(6), courts will be
required to resolve a number of additional questions that are not capable of
being answered by the text of the statute or its legislative history. These
complications weigh in favor of interpreting the statute according to its plain
terms, which do not state any requirement of tortious conduct for nondis-
chargeability. Is "tortious conduct" limited to conduct that satisfies the es-
sential elements of a recognized tort, or does it also include tort-like conduct?
If taken literally, the tortious conduct requirement would discharge debts for
a wide range of debtor misconduct that courts consistently have found to be
excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6) without much debate, including
claims for patent and copyright infringement,' 3 discrimination,135 sexual har-
assment,13 6 litigation sanctions, 37 and violation of a court order.13 8  These
claims are not technically tort claims, although like tort claims, they involve
the violation of a legal standard as opposed to a contractual obligation. If
§ 523(a)(6) does not require conduct that is literally tortious, but only tort-
like, there seems to be no principled reason to exclude claims for breach of
"'See, e.g., Barboza v. New Form, Inc. (In re Barboza), 545 F.3d 702, 709-11 (9th Cir. 2008); Albarran
v. New Form, Inc. (In re Albarran), 347 B.R. 369, 383 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2006); Monsanto Company v.
Trantham (In re Trantham) 304 B.R. 298, 308 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 2004); Yash Raj Films (USA) v. Ahmed
(In re Ahmed), 359 B.R. 34, 41-42 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005); Monsanto Co. v. Wood (In re Wood), 309 B.R.
745, 754 (Bankr. W.D.Tenn. 2004).
'
3 5See, e.g., Bernal v. Benham (In re Benham), 2008 WL 397668 at *3-4 (Bankr. D. Mass. Feb. 11,
2008); Jones v. Svreck (In re Jones), 300 B.R. 133 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2003).
11 6See, e.g., Sells v. Porter (In re Porter), 539 F.3d 889, 894-95 (8th Cir. 2008); Gee v. Hammond (In re
Gee), 173 B.R. 189, 192-93 (9th Cir. BAP. 1994). In Gee, the plaintiff had obtained a judgment under
Washington state law for sexual harassment. The debtor argued that the debt was not nondischargeable
under § 523(a)(6) because sex discrimination is not an intentional tort under Washington law. The BAP
rejected the argument, stating: "this characterization of 'wrongful' is too narrow. Wrongful acts include
conduct that infringes on the rights of others, particularly those rights protected by state or federal stat-
utes." Gee was decided by the ninth circuit B.A.P. before Jercich and Lockerby, in which the ninth circuit
court of appeals held that tortious conduct is an essential element for nondischargeability under
§ 523(a)(6). Thus, it appears that Jercich and Lockerby overrule Gee. However, in Hughes v. Arnold (In re
Hughes), 347 Fed. Appx. 359 (9th Cir. 2009), the ninth circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's holding
giving preclusive effect to a state court order awarding attorney's fees. The court of appeals stated that
"the issue of [the debtor's] willfulness and maliciousness was squarely before the state court when it
determined that he conduct was "unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or in bad faith;" and rejected the
debtor's contention that § "523(a)(6) is conditional on an intentional tort, rather than a general intention
to cause injury." Id. at 361.
i 7See, e.g., Hughes v. Arnold (In re Hughes), 347 Fed. Appx. 359, 360 (9th Cir. 2009); Papadakis v.
Zelis (In re Zelis), 66 F.3d 205, 209 (9th Cir. 1995); Suarez v. Barrett (In re Suarez), 400 B.R. 732, 738
(9th Cit. B.A.P. 2009)
isSee, e.g., Carter v. Trammell (In re Trammell), 172 B.R. 41, 44-45 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1994) (holding
that claim for breach of covenant not to compete and violation of injunction was nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(6)).
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contract where the debtor's conduct is tort-like but not literally tortious. 39
Furthermore, a requirement of tortious conduct raises other peculiar
questions, each of which takes a court another step further from the text of
the statute. For example, if "tortious conduct" does not include tort-like con-
duct, does it require an independent tort, or does it include a breach of con-
tract that is also a tort?140 If the statute requires conduct that amounts to a
tort, does applicable state law, or federal common law, determine what is
tortious? If the former, the requirement of a tort introduces some lack of
uniformity into the application of the federal statute, a result that runs
counter to one of the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.141
4. Existing case law is consistent with an interpretation of Section
523(a)(6) requiring affirmative conduct by the debtor
The courts that have held that contract claims can be nondischargeable
under § 523(a)(6) typically reason or simply assume that the statute covers
contract claims because it does not by its terms limit the types of claims that
it covers.142 However, no court has held that a knowing breach of contract
"
9 See, e.g, Nat'l Homes Corp. v. Lester Indus., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 644, 647 (D.W.D. Va. 1972) (apply-
ing § 17(a)(8) of the former Bankruptcy Act, stating that "the words of the statute are plain: a debt is not
dischargeable if it is 'for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another.' The statute
does not attempt to distinguish whether such debt arose on account of contract or tort theory.").
w'oSee, e.g., Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich) 238 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
§ 523(a)(6) does not require conduct that is a tort independent of the breach, and that it is sufficient if the
breach is tortious). The court found that the breach of a contract to pay commissions to the plaintiff was
tortious under California law because a fundamental public policy of California favors the prompt payment
of wages owed to an employee. Id. at 1207.
i4 iFor example, in Jercich, supra note 140, the ninth circuit court of appeals found that the breach of a
contract was tortious under state law based on a fundamental public policy of the state, California. Id.
Other states may not classify such conduct as tortious. Thus, the ninth circuit approach would exclude
from the scope of the exception conduct that may generally be considered tortious, such as under the
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, but which is not tortious under the law of the particular state in which the
debtor acted. Conversely, the ninth circuit approach means that the scope of the discharge will be nar-
rower in states that more liberally define tortious conduct or recognize more torts. In other words, the
ninth circuit's decision in this case allows for the non-uniform application of the exception, so that the
same conduct by debtors in two different states may lead to discharge of the debt by one debtor but not
the other.
142See, e.g., Dorr, Bentley & Pecha, CPAs, PC v. Pasek (In re Pasek), 983 F.2d 1524, 1526 (10th Cir.
1993) (indicating that contract claim for breach of covenant not to compete in a partnership agreement
could be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), while affirming the lower court decisions that in this case the
injury was not willful and malicious because the debtor acted with just cause or excuse; the plaintiff had
sought to materially alter the partnership agreement by regulating aspects of the debtor's personal and
family life and imposing an unreasonable billable hour quota on the debtor; and further the debtor reasona-
bly relied on a legal opinion that the covenant not to compete was not enforceable); N.I.S. Corp. v.
Hallahan (In re Hallahan), 936 F.2d 1496, 1500-01 (7th Cir. 1991); The Spring Works, Inc. v. Sarff (In re
Sarff), 242 B.R. 620, 626 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 2000); Nat'l Homes Corp. v. Lester Indus., Inc., 336 F. Supp. at
647 (applying § 17(a)(8) of the former Bankruptcy Act, stating that "the words of the statute are plain: a
debt is not dischargeable if it is 'for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another.'
The statute does not attempt to distinguish whether such debt arose on account of contract or tort
theory."); Humility of Mary Health Ptns. v. Garritano (In re Garritano), 427 B.R. 602, 613-14 (Bankr.
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without more is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6). Some courts state that
the claim must involve "aggravating circumstances," 43 but have not further
articulated what distinguishes a dischargeable from a nondischargeable debt
for breach of contract. Many cases involve both contract and tort or other
N.D. Ohio 2009); Iberia v. Jeffries (I-n re Jeffries), 378 B.R. 248, 254-56 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2007) (holding
that debt for damage to secured creditor's collateral was nondischargeable without addressing whether the
claim was in tort for conversion or for breach of contract); Custom Heating & Air, Inc. v. Andress (In re
Andress), 345 B.R. 358, 371 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006) (holding that the debtor acted willfully and with
malice in violating covenant not to compete, but the plaintiff failed to prove injury); Killough v. Hebert (In
re Hebert), 347 B.R. 541, 549 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2006) (indicating that breach of contract claims can be
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), but holding that the evidence in this case did not show that the
debtor 'did anything to [the plaintiff] that objectively could have been certain to cause harm . .. or that
[the debtor] was motivated to cause [the plaintiff] harm."); Prairie Eye Center v. Butler (In re Butler), 297
B.R. 741, 747-49 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003) (holding that debt arising from breach of covenant not to compete
and violation of injunction was nondischargeable); A.V. Reilly Int'l Ltd. v. Rosenzweig (In re Rosenzweig),
237 B.R. 453, 459 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) (holding debt for breach of covenant not to compete was
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) where the debtor "not only intended to commit the wrongful acts of
violating the continuing covenants under the employment contract . . . by setting up [a new company]
with two [of plaintiffs] employees and taking some of the [plaintiffs] customers with them, he also
intended to injure [the plaintiffs] property interests in its protected trade secrets by diverting to [his own
company] business which otherwise would have tone to [the plaintiff]. The Debtor candidly admitted ...
that he knew what he was doing and what its effect upon [the plaintiff] would be."); Novartis Corp. v.
Luppino (In re Luppino), 221 B.R. 693, 699-700 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (indicating that contract claims
can be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) if there are aggravating circumstances, but holding that state
court judgment for commercial bribery and breach of duty of loyalty was dischargeable under § 523(a)(6));
Bundy Am. Corp. v. Blankfort (In re Blankfort), 217 B.R. 138, 144-46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that
malice "will be found by imputation where the debtor has breached a duty to the plaintiff founded in
contract, statute or tort law," and holding that debt for breach of franchise agreement and trademark
infringement was dischargeable, but that debt for the debtor's continuing breach of the agreement and
infringement," coupled with repeated and blatant violations of four district court orders, was nondis-
chargeable); Carter v. Trammell (In re Trammell), 172 BR. 41, 44 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1994) (explaining
that "to fall within the purview of section 523(a)(6), it is sufficient that (1) [the debtor] intentionally
disregarded the provisions of the agreements, and (2) knowing that the breach would harm [the creditor],
proceeded to act in contravention of the agreements"); Traditional Industries, Inc. v. Ketaner (In re
Ketaner), 149 B.R. 395, 400-01 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992) (finding that debtor caused a willful and malicious
injury in breaching a covenant not to compete). See also Stevens v. Antonious (In re Antonious), 358 B.R.
172, 187 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 2006) (holding that negligent performance of a home improvement contract does
not give rise to nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(6)); Mutum v. Rickabaugh (In re Rickabaugh), 355
B.R. 743, 758 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2006) (holding that debt for ordinary breach of contract was dischargea-
ble under § 523(a)(6)); Rezin v. Barr (In re Barr), 194 B.R. 1009, 1024 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that
breach of contract was not willful and malicious, therefore debt was dischargeable); Rose v. Rose (In re
Rose), 155 B.R. 394, 397-99 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1993) (involving breach of a property settlement agree-
ment); FDIC v. Smith (In re Smith), 160 B.R. 549, 553 (D. N.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that "§ 523(a)(6) does
not mandate proof of an independent, recognized tort, but instead requires only the showing that the
debtor's actions were willful and malicious, i.e., done intentionally and without just cause or excuse.");
Worldwide Bearing and Auto. Parts, Inc. v. Springer (In re Springer), 85 B.R. 634, 635 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1988) (involving a claim based on civil theft and misappropriation of trade secrets, not for breach of
contract; the court stated that "[how the debt arose is of no real consequence. The theory of recovery is
immaterial.").
"'See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Khafaga (In re Khafaga), 2009 WL 4269441 at *8 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 30, 2009); In re Luppino, 221B.R. at 700; In re Blankfort, 217 BR. at 144-45 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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non-contract claims, so that the statements regarding nondischargeability of
the contract claims may be read as dicta.144 Although it does not appear that
any court has explicitly recognized that "willfulness" requires voluntary, af-
firmative conduct by the debtor, the decisions by courts applying § 523(a)(6)
to contract claims are generally consistent with this reading of the statute.
The cases in which a creditor seeks to except a contract claim from dis-
charge under § 523(a)(6) often involve covenants not to compete; contracts
to pay an obligation from a designated source of funds; and home construction
or home improvement contracts.145 In the noncompetition agreement cases,
the debtor has not merely failed to perform, but has acted affirmatively in
violating the contract. Courts that have analyzed this scenario have repeat-
edly, although not invariably, held the debt from the breach of contract to be
nondischargeable. Likewise, in the cases involving misappropriation of
earmarked funds, the debtor usually has not only failed to pay over funds to
the creditor, but has acted by diverting the funds to other purposes. By
contrast, in the cases involving home construction or improvement contracts,
a debtor's failure to perform in accordance with the contract is properly re-
garded as a breach by failure to perform, and not as affirmative conduct in
violation of the contract. In these cases, it can be difficult to discern whether
the breach was by nonfeasance rather than malfeasance, which may help ex-
plain why these cases have arisen repeatedly under § 523(a)(6). The courts
in these cases have consistently held that the debt was dischargeable under
§ 523(a)(6).146
144See, e.g., The Spring Works, Inc. v. Sarff (In re Sarff), 242 B.R. 620, 625-29 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 2000)
(holding that a state court judgment for breach of a covenant not to compete, breach of contract, breach of
duty of loyalty, misappropriation of trade secrets, intentional interference with business relations and
discovery sanctions collaterally estopped the debtor to contest nondischargeability of the debt under
§ 523(a)(6)); Voyatzoglou v. Hambley (In re Hambley), 329 BR. 382, 402 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding
that breach of agreement to return payments in the event that a deal was not finalized constituted a debt
for willful and malicious injury; the plaintiff also asserted claims for conversion, fraud, RICO violations and
civil theft); Prairie Eye Center v. Butler (In re Butler), 297 B.R. 741, 747-49 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2004)
(holding that debt for breach of covenant not to compete and violation of injunction was nondischarge-
able); In re Blankfort, 217 B.R. at 144-46 (holding that debt for breach of franchise agreement and trade-
mark infringement was dischargeable, but that debt for debtor's continuing breach of the agreement and
infringement, coupled with repeated and blatant violations of four district court orders was nondischarge-
able). See also In re Colclazier, 134 B.R. at 33 (stating that "from a review of the decisions of those courts
which have excepted from discharge damages from injuries arising from the breach of a contract, that they
have done so only upon finding an independent, willful tort").
i4'See infra notes 147-89 and accompanying text.
146There are a number of § 523(a)(6) cases involving the breach of a contract other than a covenant
not to compete, promise to pay an obligation from a designated source or agreement for home improve-
ments. These cases, too, should be analyzed on the basis of whether the breach involved a failure to act in
accordance with the contract, or affirmative conduct in violation of the contract that is also willful and
malicious. A leading case and a good example is Williams v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 520, 337 F.3d
504 (5th Cir. 2003). In Williams, the debtor operated an electrical contracting business. He entered into
a collective bargaining agreement with the plaintiff union, promising that he would hire exclusively
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a. Cases involving covenants not to compete
Except in the ninth circuit, where the court of appeals has held that
§ 523(a)(6) requires tortious conduct,'47 courts have repeatedly found that
debts arising from a knowing breach of a covenant not to compete are nondis-
chargeable. In these cases, the debtor's conduct in violating the noncompeti-
tion agreement was affirmative as well as intentional, deliberate and without
just cause or excuse.148
through union referrals. He knowingly breached this contract by hiring non-union electricians, and the
union obtained a judgment in federal court for payment of restitution of wages and benefits to the affected
union members and the union's attorney's fees. Id. at 506-08. When the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the
plaintiff sought a determination that this debt was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).
The fifth circuit concluded that contract claims may be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) if the
breach is willful, but held that in this case, any injury to the union (as opposed to individual members of
the union) was neither intended nor substantially certain. Id. at 510-11. The court found that when the
debtor hired non-union electricians, he was motivated by a desire to complete the pending project and to
save his business, and thus did not intend to injure the Union. Id. at 511. The court stated that whether
the breach was substantially certain to harm the union was a closer question, but did not resolve the
question because it concluded that it was the union members, and not the plaintiff union, that were
substantially certain to suffer injury as a result of the breach. Id. The court stated that the only direct
injuries suffered by the union were to its prestige and to its capacity to uphold its contracts, and that
neither of these injuries was substantially certain to flow from the breach. Id.
At first blush, the facts of Williams suggest that the debtor acted affirmatively in breaching the CBA.
He hired non-union electricians instead of union referrals. But upon closer inspection, the injury to the
plaintiff union or to the members of the union resulted exclusively from the failure to use union referrals
and not from the hiring of the non-union electricians. The case is quite different than the misuse of funds
designated for payment of a particular obligation, or the violation of a covenant not to compete, where the
injury is the result of what the debtor has done, and not what he has failed to do vis a vis the plaintiff.
The breach of the CBA in Williams is indistinguishable from the typical efficient breach, where a con-
tracting party enters into a substitute transaction for economic reasons. See R. POSNER, EcoNoMic
ANALYSIS OP LAW § 4.9, at 89-90 (2d ed. 1977). The breach in Williams was no more willful than a
buyer's decision to buy goods from another supplier at a lower price than contracted with the original
supplier. Thus, although Williams was correct in concluding that § 523(a)(6) can apply to contract claims,
it did not articulate any principle that effectively distinguished that case from an ordinary knowing breach
of contract. (The Williams opinion is strained on several points, as discussed in the Appendix, infra notes
191-203 and accompanying text.)
147See Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that deliberate
breach of contract had to be accompanied by a tort to be excepted from discharge for willful and malicious
injury); JB Constr., Inc. v. King (In re King), 403 B.R. 86, 93-95 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) (holding that debt
for violation of covenant not to compete was dischargeable where debtor did not commit associated tort of
intentional interference with contract or intentional interference with prospective economic advantage);
A.K.D., Inc. v. Treon (In re Treon), 2008 WL 65575 at *3 (Bankr. D.Or. Jan. 4, 2008) (holding that the
debt for breach of a covenant not to compete was dischargeable because there was no associated tortious
conduct).
i4sSee The Spring Works, Inc. v. Sarff (In re Sarff), 242 B.R. 620, 625-26 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 2000); Nat'l
Home Corp. v. Lester Indus., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 644, 646-48 (D. W.D. Va. 1972); Expressdrop, Inc. v.
Mateyko (In re Mateyko), 437 B.R. 313, 320-22 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 2010) (holding that debt for violation of
covenant not to compete in franchise agreement was nondischargeable where debtor operated a competing
business in knowing violation of the covenant and told plaintiff he wanted to break the agreement and
would get away with it); Custom Heating & Air, Inc. v. Andress (In re Andress), 345 B.R. 358, 371
(Bankr. N.D.Okla. 2006) (holding that debt for debtor's violation of covenant not to compete with busi-
ness he sold to plaintiff was for willful and malicious injury; reasoning that the debtor had -admitted that
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Rescuecom Corporation v. Khafaga (In re Khafaga)149 is illustrative.
There, the court held that the plaintiffs complaint stated a claim under
§ 523(a)(6) in alleging that the debtor breached the covenants not to com-
pete in two franchise agreements by secretly diverting clients from the two
franchises to a company owned by his wife.o50 The debtor's income reports
to the plaintiff franchisor misstated the franchise's income by not reporting
any of the revenue generated by the competing business.' 5 ' The court held
that the complaint sufficiently alleged that the debtor acted willfully because
it alleged that the debtor acted with intent to injure the plaintiff and that the
debtor knew that injury would result from his breach of the franchise agree-
ment.152 Regarding malice, the court stated that a 'knowing breach of con-
tract generally does not satisfy the malicious element of § 523(a)(6) absent
'some aggravating circumstance evidencing conduct so reprehensible as to
warrant denial of the "fresh start" to which the "honest but unfortunate"
debtor would normally be entitled under the Bankruptcy Code.'" 53 The
court added that generally a debtor has not acted maliciously if he was seek-
ing profit or other benefit.154 In this case, the court held that the plaintiff
alleged aggravating circumstances that would create a factual question
he ... diverted potential customers ... with knowledge of his contractual obligations ... and he fully
intended the consequences of his actions."); Prairie Eye Ctr. v. Butler (In re Butler), 297 B.R. 741, 748-49
(Bankr. C.D.Ill. 2003) (holding that debt for debtor's violation of covenant not to compete with employer
for period following termination of employment was nondischargeable; reasoning that the debtor "repeat-
edly and purposefully engaged in acts which he knew to be in violation of the covenant," and that while
"debtor may dispute that he subjectively intended to injure Plaintiff by intentionally violating the cove-
nant not to compete, ... [he] does not (and could not) seriously dispute the fact that he had subjective
knowledge that injury to Plaintiff was substantially certain to result from his intentional acts."); Carter v.
Trammell (In re Trammell), 172 B.R. 41, 44-46 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1994) (holding debt nondischargeable
under § 523(a)(6) where debtor violated covenant not to compete by working for clients whose accounts
he had sold to the plaintiff; reasoning that the injury was willful because debtor intended to breach the
contract, and that the injury was malicious because the debtor was aware of the contract terms, and
proceeded nevertheless to violate the plaintiffs rights under the contract); Trad. Indus., Inc. v. Ketaner (In
re Ketaner), 149 B.R. 395, 401 (Bankr. E.D.Va. 1992) (holding that debt for breach of covenant not to
compete was nondischargeable where debtor opened a new company to compete with the business he had
sold to the debtor, and induced nearly the entire staff of his former company to work for his new com-
pany); A.V. Reilly Int'l, Ltd. v. Rosenzweig (In re Rosenzweig), 237 B.R. 453, 459 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999)
(holding that debt for breach of covenant not to compete and violation of Illinois Trade Secrets Act was
nondischargeable where the debtor "knew what he was doing and what its effect upon [the plaintiff]
would be."). See also N.I.S. Corp. v. Hallahan (In re Hallahan), 936 F.2d 1496, 1500 (7th Cit. 1991)
(conceding by debtor that if the covenant not to compete was valid, his breach of the covenant was willful
and malicious).
i49419 B.R. 539 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 2009).
iSoId. at 548-52.
"sId. at 552.
is2Id. at 549.
5
'Id. at 550 (quoting Novartis v. Luppino (In re Luppino), 221 B.R. 693, 700 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
4
"Id.
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whether the debtor acted in a socially reprehensible way.155
The Complaint does not merely allege that the Defendant
violated the non-compete clause, and failed to pay royalties
pursuant to the Franchise Agreements. Rather, it goes fur-
ther, alleging that the Defendant secretly opened a compet-
ing business under his wife's name in order to avoid
detection, actively diverted customers and business away
from his own Rescuecom franchises and submitted false re-
ports to Rescuecom to conceal his actions, with the specific
intent to deprive the Plaintiff of royalties under the
Franchise Agreements. 56
In Khafaga the debtor acted affirmatively and with knowledge that his
conduct would cause injury, although the court concludes that the plaintiffs
injury was willful based solely on the finding that the debtor knew that in-
jury would result from his conduct. 157 This can be said of any knowing
breach of contract, so that according to this analysis, it was the malice prong
of the statute that distinguished dischargeable from nondischargeable claims
for knowing breach of contract. As discussed above, reliance on the malice
prong of the statute to distinguish between dischargeable and nondischarge-
able contract claims is analytically unsound.1s8
That the breach of a covenant not to compete entails affirmative conduct
does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the debt is nondischargeable
under § 523(a)(6). Recall that in Geiger, the debtor acted affirmatively in
committing malpractice, but the debt was not for a willful injury. Similarly,
in several of the noncompetition agreement cases, the courts have held that
the debt was dischargeable when the plaintiffs injury was either not inten-
tional or not malicious, although in violating the covenant the debtor acted
affirmatively and did not simply fail to perform. For example, in A.K.D., Inc.
v. Treon (In re Treon),159 the court held that the debtor did not knowingly,
and thus did not willfully, violate a covenant not to compete where her attor-
ney advised her that her conduct was not prohibited by the covenant.160 For
the same reason, the court found that the breach was not without excuse, and
ssId. at 550-52.
15Id. at 552.
117419 B.R. at 549.
"
8 See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text (discussing use of the -malicious" requirement in
§ 523(a)(6) to distinguish dischargeable from nondischargeable claims for breach of contract).
'92008 WL 65575 (Bankr. D. Or. Jan. 4, 2008). The Treon court is in the ninth circuit. The court
based its conclusion on the alternative grounds that the debtor did not commit an independent tort and
that the injury was not willful and malicious. Id. at *3-7.
"'Id. at *7.
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therefore was not malicious.' 6' The debtor's contract with the plaintiff to
provide home health service prohibited her from working for any of the plain-
tiffs clients for three months after termination of employment.162 Her attor-
ney advised her that the covenant did not apply to former clients, and the
debtor thereafter accepted a job with a former client within three months of
leaving her employment with the plaintiff.163
As discussed earlier, an interpretation of § 523(a)(6) that prevents the
discharge of claims for knowing breach of contract would be inconsistent
with the provisions in § 365 that expressly authorize the intentional breach
- rejection - of executory contracts.164 In the case of noncompetition
agreements, this conflict largely disappears. While the case law is not consis-
tent, the prevailing view is that noncompetition agreements are not execu-
tory, and therefore cannot be rejected.165 Also, some courts have held that
the breach of a noncompetition agreement does not give rise to a "claim"
'
6 1Id.
1621d.
'631d. at *6-7. See also Dorr, Bentley & Pecha, CPA's, P.C. v. Pasek (In re Pasek), 983 F.2d 1524, 1528
(10th Cir. 1993) (affirming lower court's holding that the debtor acted with just cause or excuse in
violating a covenant not to compete where the debtor's former employer had sought to materially alter its
agreement with the debtor to regulate his and his wife's personal affairs and to impose an unreasonable
billable hours requirement on the debtor, and the debtor had reasonably relied on advice from his attorney
that the covenant was unenforceable); Bundy Am. Corp. v. Blankfort (In re Blankfort), 217 B.R. 138, 143-
46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that debtor's breach of post-termination provision of franchise agree-
ment by continuing to operate the franchise and use the trade and service marks and logo of the plaintiff
after the franchise had been terminated was not malicious because there were not sufficient aggravating
circumstances). Cf Carter v. Trammell (In re Trammell), 172 B.R. 41, 46 (Bankr. W.D.Ark. 1994) (stating
that court did not believe the debtor's assertion that he acted on the advice of an attorney in violating a
covenant not to compete). Accord, Prairie Eye Ctr. v. Butler (In re Butler), 297 B.R. 741, 749 (Bankr.
C.D.Ill. 2003) (rejecting the debtor's argument that his violation of noncompetition clause was not willful
because he was seeking to serve his patients and to support two families).
'
6 4See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
"'sSee, e.g., In re Drake, 136 B.R. 325, 328 (Bankr. D. Mass 1992) (holding that neither the debtor's
obligation not to compete nor the plaintiffs obligation to make monthly payments made contract execu-
tory); Oseen v. Walker (In re Oseen), 133 B.R. 527, 529-30 (Bankr. D. Idaho) (holding that contract was
not executory where sole performance remaining was debtor's duty not to compete); In re Bluman, 125
B.R. 359, 361-65 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that neither the debtor's obligation not to compete nor
the plaintiffs obligation to make monthly payments made contract executory); In re Noco, Inc., 76 B.R.
839, 843 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that noncompetition agreement was not an executory contract
where there was no remaining performance obligation, only debtor's obligation not to complete). See also
In re Spectrum Info. Techs., Inc., 190 B.R. 741, 747-48 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996) (involving obligations of
confidentiality and noninterference). But see In re Teligent, 268 B.R. 723, 729-32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(finding that merger agreement was an executory contract where debtor had remaining obligation not to
compete and plaintiff had continuing obligation to make monthly payments); Burger King Corp. v. Rovine
Corp. (In re Rovine Corp.), 5 B.R. 402, 404 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980) (holding that covenant not to
compete was an executory contract). See generally 2 NoRTON BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE 46:9
(West 3d ed. 2010).
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within the meaning of Code § 101(5)166 because the claimant has an equita-
ble remedy, and not a right to payment. 167 As such, the obligation is not
subject to discharge.168 These approaches to the treatment of noncompeti-
tion agreements are consistent with the view that a claim for the prepetition
breach of a covenant not to compete may be nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(6). These approaches may be criticized, however, as a means to ex-
clude claims from discharge without subjecting them to analysis under
§ 523(a)(6) or another of the exceptions to discharge in Code § 523(a).
b. Cases involving agreements to pay funds from a designated
source
In breaching a contract to pay monies from a designated source, the
debtor not only fails to perform the obligation to the promisee, but may also
act voluntarily and affirmatively in using the monies for other purposes. In
such cases, the nonbreaching party is injured both by the debtor's nonpay-
ment of the debt and by his diversion of the designated funds.
Outside of the ninth circuit169 courts have consistently found these debts
to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) upon proof that the debtor diverted
the funds. In Sanders v. Vaughn (In re Sanders),170 the debtor had hired the
plaintiff attorney on a contingency fee basis to seek a tax refund from the
IRS.171 The contract gave the plaintiff a power of attorney and provided
that tax refund checks would be sent to him and that he would deduct his fee
from those funds.172 Upon learning that the IRS was willing to pay him
$30,000 to settle his claim, the debtor wrote a letter to the IRS revoking the
power of attorney and directing that the refund check be sent to him.17 In
this way, the debtor "beat [the plaintiff] out of the fee."174 The tenth circuit
16611 U.S.C. § 101(5) ("[T]he term 'claim' means-(A) right to payment ... ; or (B) right to an
equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment").
167Kennedy v. Medicap Pharmacies, Inc., 267 F.3d 493, 496-98 (6th Cir. 2001); In re Udell, 18 F.3d
403, 408-10 (7th Cir. 1994); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY p 101.05[5] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds. 16th ed.). Contra, The Maids Int'l, Inc. v. Ward (In re Ward), 194 B.R. 703, 714-15 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1996) (holding that plaintiffs injunctive rights with respect to debtor's breach of a covenant not
to compete constituted a claim).
'A discharge in bankruptcy discharges the debtor from "debts." See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(b), 1328(a),
1141(d). "Debt" is defined as "liability on a claim." Id. at § 101(12).1691n the ninth circuit, the rule that § 523(a)(6) requires tortious conduct has in several cases led to
the discharge of a debt for diversion of earmarked funds. See Lockerby v. Sierra, 535 F.3d 1038, 1039,
1043-44 (9th Cir. 2008) (involving agreement by which the debtor attorney assigned to plaintiff fifty
percent of the fees from four pending cases); Del Bino v. Bailey (In re Bailey), 197 F.3d 997, 999, 1002-03
(9th Cir. 1999) (involving agreement to pay attorney's fees and costs from settlement of case).
'0210 F.3d 390 (Table), 2000 WL 328136 (10th Cir. Mar. 29, 2000).17 1Id. at *1.1721d.
'"Id.
'
7 4Sanders, 210 F.3d at 390 (quoting the bankruptcy court, Adversary Proceeding 98-1157-BH, at 2
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. Oct. 14, 1998) (unpublished decision)).
2014) 211
212 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 88
court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion that did not separately
consider the "willful" and "malicious" prongs of the statute.17s
In Alessi v. Alessi (In re Alessi),176 the debtor and her ex-husband agreed
that, upon sale of a house, the debtor would remit a portion of the net pro-
ceeds to her ex-husband.177 Instead, she sold the house and paid various
credit card debts, effectively dissipating the home sale proceeds.178 The
bankruptcy court held that the debt was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6),
explaining:
In most instances, a knowing breach of contract does not
create an injury that is both willful and malicious. However,
the present facts indicate more than a simple knowing failure
to pay a contractual obligation. By agreement, Lee and Amy
had identified the time and source of payment. . . . Then,
after the start of an action in state court to compel the prom-
ised disbursement of funds, she paid the moneys to other
creditors. . . .
This case presents not just a failure to pay a debt, but a
failure to pay from funds that the debtor had agreed specifi-
cally to earmark for that purpose. . . . the funds were accessi-
ble and not otherwise encumbered . . . the debtor knew of
her obligation to turn over the funds ... 179
175Id.
176405 B.R. 65 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2009).
177Id. at 66.17 1d. at 66-67.
I791d. at 68. Accord, Rose v. Rose (In re Rose), 155 B.R. 394, 397-98 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1993) (holding
that debt for failure to pay monies owed under property division agreement was nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(6)). See also Banks v. Gill Distrib. (In re Banks), 263 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding debt
nondischargeable where debtor attorney failed to pay portion of law suit recovery to another party in the
case as agreed to in a settlement agreement, in an attempt to force the plaintiff to accept less than it was
entitled to or to delay payment until the statute of limitations had run on the plaintiffs claim); Humility of
Mary Health Partners v. Garritano (In re Garritano), 427 B.R. 602, 613-14 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2009)
(holding that debtor's failure to remit income from medical practice to his employer (who was paying him a
salary of $250,000 per year) pursuant to employment agreement constituted willful and malicious injury);
Voyatzoglou v. Hambley (In re Hambley), 329 B.R. 382, 402 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that debt for
breach of agreement to return payments in the event that a deal was not finalized was for willful and
malicious injury); Stephens v. Morrison (In re Morrison), 450 B.R. 734, 752-54 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2011)
(holding that debtor's use of monies paid by plaintiff under home renovation contract for personal expenses
instead of for the renovation work gave rise to debt for willful and malicious injury). Cf. Goldberg Sec.,
Inc. v. Scarlata (In re Scarlata), 979 F.2d 521, 526-27 (7th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 979 F.2d 521, 528 n.9
(holding that the bankruptcy court did not err in holding that the debtor, a market maker who traded
options on plaintiffs account in violation of their agreement, acted willfully but not with malice; debtor's
misuse of plaintiffs credit is comparable to a misappropriation of earmarked funds); In re Nance, 556 F.2d
602, 610-11 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding that debt was for willful and malicious injury and nondischargeable
under former Bankruptcy Act where the debtor had assigned to plaintiff deferred income to be paid to the
debtor by his employer); Condon Oil Co. v. Wood (In re Wood), 503 B.R. 705 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2013)
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The cases involving breach of a contract to remit identified funds are very
similar to the cases involving conversion of a secured creditor's collateral or
proceeds of collateral.'s 0 In both types of cases, specific property has been
identified with payment of the creditor's claim, and the debtor injures the
creditor by misappropriating that property to other purposes.
In the conversion of collateral cases, the creditor obviously has a cogniza-
ble legal interest in the collateral or proceeds, and the misappropriation typi-
cally constitutes the tort of conversion as well as a breach of a contract. In
many of the cases involving breach of a contract to remit designated funds, it
likewise appears that the creditor had a property interest in the funds, en-
forceable in bankruptcy, for example, by assignment from the debtor. The
courts' reasoning in these cases does not depend on the promisee having a
property interest in the funds.181 In these cases, the misappropriation is not
necessarily a tort because traditionally, the tort requires conversion of a chat-
tel and may not cover the taking of money or contract rights or intangible
property interests.182
(holding debt nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) where debtor, an owner/operator of two gas stations,
posted signs on the gas pumps stating that only cash or checks would be accepted as payment, knowing
that under contract with creditor, all credit sales were credited to the creditor's account).
1
soSee, e.g., Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 330 (1934) (holding that debt for conversion
of secured creditor's collateral was dischargeable absent "aggravating features"); Friendly Fin. Svc. Mid-
City, Inc. v. Modicue (In re Modicue), 926 F.2d 452, 452-53 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding debt for conversion
of secured creditor's collateral nondischargeable where debtor sold the property worth $1300 at a rum-
mage sale for $120); Vulcan Coals, Inc. v. Howard, 946 F.2d 1226, 1229 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that
creditor sufficiently alleged claim for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6) where it alleged that debtor
participated in transfer of mortgaged property without notifying the creditor); Bank of Western Oklahoma
v. Cantrell (In re Cantrell), 208 BR. 498, 502 (10th Cir. B.A.P. 1997) (affirming nondischargeability
determination under § 523(a)(6) where debtor was an experienced businessman, had knowledge of the
creditor's security interest, transferred the property without the creditor's consent, and concealed the
transfer).
"See Humility of Mary Health Partners v. Carritano (In re Garritano), 427 BR. 602, 613-14 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 2009) (holding debt nondischargeable where debtor doctor had diverted certain income from a
medical practice that he had previously assigned to plaintiff); Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 824 (5th Cir.
1998) (holding debt nondischargable where debtor university professor had diverted income from outside
professional services that he had previously assigned to his employer). See also In re Nance, 556 F.2d 602,
611 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding debt nondischargeable where debtor diverted deferred income owed to him
by his employer and which he had previously equitably assigned to plaintiff).
182The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 222A defines "conversion" as an "intentional exercise of
dominion or control over a chattel . . . ." Chattel is generally understood to mean tangible, personal
property, and not to comprehend money or intangible rights in property. See Black's Law Dictionary (9th
ed. 2009) (defining "chattel" as "[m]ovable or transferable property; personal property; esp., a physical
object capable of manual delivery"). Over time, the scope of the tort has been expanded beyond chattels,
but does not necessarily cover all property interests. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242 cmt.
f (providing that "[i]t is at present the prevailing view that there can be no conversion of an ordinary debt
not represented by a document, or of such intangible rights as the goodwill of a business or the names of
customers.").
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c. Cases involving home construction and improvement
contracts
The courts have consistently held that debts arising from the breach of a
construction or renovation contract are not for willful and malicious in-
jury.183 In these cases, the home owner's injury is not willful where the
debtor acted negligently or incompetently, even grossly negligently or incom-
petently, in performing the contract.184 In the case of Prewett v. Iberg (In re
Iberg),185 "the debtor used substandard materials as well as unacceptable and
inadequate construction practices," and the construction was so bad that an
expert reported that his "inspections revealed the most blatant disregard for
[the homeowner's] physical safety and financial waste I have ever witnessed
in my over 30 years in this profession."186 The debtor was not licensed (he
used his wife's construction license on the contract because he was incapable
of passing the licensing exam himself), and the court found that he "com-
pletely lacked the requisite skill sets to hold himself out as a contractor."187
His supervision of the work site was so poor that "someone defecated in the
attic, leaving the remains to be discovered by" the homeowner's structural
engineer.'88 The bankruptcy court concluded that the debt was dischargea-
ble under § 523(a)(6), explaining that "[t]he concept of 'willful' requires
something greater than recklessness or negligence; it requires an intention or
desire to injure the aggrieved party. The debtor is simply an incompetent
contractor. . . . The record does not sufficiently reflect that the debtor acted
in bad faith or had an active intent to build a house that would economically
or physically harm" the homeowner.' 8 9
""See, e.g., cases cited infra note 206.
'
5 4 See, e.g., Prewett v. Iberg (In re Iberg), 395 B.R. 83 (Bankr. E.D.Ark. 2008) (holding debt dischargea-
ble where debtor was incompetent, but did not intend or desire to cause injury) and cases cited infra note
189.
19'In re Iberg, 395 B.R. 83.
s
5 6Id. at 87.
'"Id. at 87-88.
i"Id. at 88.
"Id. at 92. Accord, Siebanoller v. Rabrig (In re Rahrig), 373 B.R. 829, 835-36 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
2007) (holding that, although debtor's roofing work may have been unprofessional, it could not be charac-
terized as willful and malicious within the meaning of § 523(a)(6) and was "at worst, negligent"); Stevens
v. Antonious (In re Antonious), 358 B.R. 172, 187 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (stating that "[n]egligent per-
formance of a home repair contract falls outside the scope of section 523(a)(6)"); Rezin v. Barr (In re Barr),
194 B.R. 1009, 1024 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding that plaintiffs did not prove that debtor "intended to
build the property with defects . . .though the evidence showed that he was obviously negligent . . . and
breached the contract and building code in many ways;" holding that debt was dischargeable under
§ 523(a)(6)); Vaughn v. Quinn (In re Quinn), 180 B.R. 550, 553 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1995) (finding that
debtor's faulty plumbing repairs did not rise to the level of willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6));
Taylor v. Kaufmann (In re Kaufmann), 57 B.R. 644, 648 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1986) (holding that debt was
dischargeable under § 523(a)(6) where "debtor negligently but with good intentions undertook and then
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V. CONCLUSION
The courts are closely divided on whether Code § 523(a)(6)'s exception
to discharge applies to contract claims or require tortious conduct. The
courts that apply the statute to contract claims uniformly hold that
§ 523(a)(6) does not except from discharge debts for ordinary breach of con-
tract, but have not articulated a coherent doctrine for distinguishing between
claims for ordinary intentional breach of contract from those that cause a
willful and malicious injury. This article has considered various alternative
approaches to interpreting the exception as it applies to contract claims. The
thesis is that the statute by its terms potentially applies to any claim for
willful and malicious injury, including contract claims; and that the statute
requires voluntary and affirmative conduct, as well as deliberate and mali-
cious injury, for nondischargeability. The requirement of affirmative conduct
parallels the application of the statute to tort and other sorts of claims, and
effectively excludes from the scope of the exception to discharge claims for
ordinary, but knowing, breaches of contract.
APPENDIX: APPELLATE DECISIONS ON WHETHER CODE
SECTION 523(a)(6) EXCEPTS FROM DISCHARGE CLAIMS FOR
KNOWING BREACH OF CONTRACT
This Appendix reviews the circuit court of appeals and bankruptcy ap-
pellate panel decisions that bear on whether § 523(a)(6) requires tortious
conduct. This review does not cover cases involving a claim for conversion of
a secured creditor's collateral or proceeds of collateral; while the secured
creditor in these cases may have a claim for breach of contract, conversion is a
tort, and thus the cases do not involve the breach of a contract independent
of any claim in tort. The objective is to provide a detailed examination of the
appellate case law in each circuit that will be useful in seeking or opposing
the discharge of a contract claim under § 523(a)(6) in a given bankruptcy
court. The fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth circuit appellate
courts have addressed the dischargeability of contract claims under
§ 523(a)(6), while the first, second, third, fourth and eleventh circuits have
not. While published circuit court decisions are binding on all lower courts
within the circuit,9oo BAP decisions are not; however, in the absence of bind-
performed a job he thought he could handle but, after experiencing various problems, discovered that he
was unable to undo the resulting damages.").
90Four of the circuit court decisions - one each from the fifth, sixth, seventh and tenth circuit courts
of appeals - are unpublished opinions issued before 2007. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1
states that "[a] court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial opinions . . . that have
been . . . designated as 'unpublished' . . . or the like; and . .. issued on or after January 1, 2007." F.R.A.P.
32.1. The effect of unpublished decisions, and whether pre-2007 unpublished decisions may be cited, are
matters left to the local rules of each circuit. See Robert Timothy Reagan, Citing Unpublished Federal
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ing circuit court authority, BAP decisions may be especially persuasive.
In summary, the fifth and tenth circuits have clearly stated that contract
claims can be excepted from the discharge under § 523(a)(6). The reasoning
in the leading fifth circuit decision is flimsy, and an unpublished fifth circuit
decision contradicts it. The most recent of the two tenth circuit decisions
does state that contract claims can be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6),
but the statement is dicta. The other tenth circuit case was decided before
Geiger, so its conclusory reasoning is subject to reconsideration in light of
Geiger. The ninth circuit has unequivocally held that tortious conduct is an
essential element of § 523(a)(6), and the eighth circuit has somewhat less
definitively stated the same rule in dicta. The two seventh circuit cases that
address the issue are inconclusive.
A. FIFTH CIRCUIT
In Williams v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local
520,191 the fifth circuit stated that a claim for breach of contract can be
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), but held that on the facts of the case the
injury suffered by the plaintiff union (as distinct from its members) was not
willful and malicious. Thus, the pronouncement on the scope of § 523(a)(6)
was not necessary to the decision in the case; the court could have ignored
the question whether § 523(a)(6) requires tortious conduct, and held that in
any event the debt was not nondischargeable on the facts of the case. In no
case has the fifth circuit actually held that a contract claim was nondischarge-
able in the absence of an independent tort.
The court in Williams did not consider the merits of the competing inter-
pretations of § 523(a)(6). Rather, it based its conclusion that a breach of
contract may involve a willful and malicious injury apart from any tortious
conduct on the Supreme Court's decision in Geiger and two fifth circuit deci-
sions, Texas v. Walker (In re Walker)192 and Miller v. J.D. Abrams Inc. (In re
Miller).93 However, Geiger is not authority for the conclusion that
§ 523(a)(6) applies to contract claims, and moreover, the court misconstrued
both Walker and Miller. Neither case addressed whether debts for knowing
breach of contract can be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) absent tortious
conduct. Indeed, contrary to the Williams court's reading of it, Walker al-
most certainly assumed that § 523(a)(6) requires tortious conduct, as the
Appellate Opinions Issued Before 2007, 241 F.R.D. 328 (2007). The fifth, sixth and tenth circuit local
rules permit citation of any unpublished opinions, while the seventh circuit prohibits citation of unpub-
lished decisions issued before 2007. Id.
'9i 3 3 7 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 2003).
'9'142 F.3d 813 (1998).
'9' 1 5 6 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 1998).
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plaintiffs claim sounded both in contract and in tort.194 Miller did not in-
volve a contract claim at all, nor does the opinion contain any dictum that is
pertinent to the question whether § 523(a)(6) covers contract claims. (The
Williams court also did not acknowledge an unpublished decision by another
panel of the fifth circuit several months earlier holding that Geiger 'explicitly
rejects a construction of 'willful' under which a breach of contract could qual-
ify."1 95) Thus, the foundation for the fifth circuit rule that § 523(a)(6) does
not require tortious conduct is unsound.
In Williams, the debtor operated an electrical contracting business. He
entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the plaintiff union, prom-
ising that he would hire exclusively through union referrals. He knowingly
breached this contract, and the union initiated a grievance that was resolved
when the parties agreed to an Agreed Final Judgment and Decree that was
entered by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Under
the agreed judgment, the debtor was required to hire exclusively through the
union. The district court also ordered the debtor to pay restitution of wages
and benefits to union members denied employment under the original con-
tract, and to pay the union's attorney's fees. The debtor thereafter violated
the agreed judgment by hiring non-union electricians. The union filed a com-
plaint, and the district court awarded restitution and attorney's fees for the
debtor's violation of the judgment.196
The fifth circuit acknowledged that Geiger "seems to reject the proposi-
tion that a debt arising from a knowing breach of contract is a willful and
malicious injury excepted from discharge."197 (In its discussion of the stan-
dards for willful and malicious injury, the court also noted that the Supreme
Court in Geiger had observed that "the language of [§1 523(a)(6) mirrors the
definition of an intentional tort."' 98) Reading Geiger together with Walker
and Miller, however, the fifth circuit concluded that nondischargeability
under § 523(a)(6) turns on the knowledge and intent of the debtor at the
time of breach, and not on whether his conduct is classified as a tort.'99
The court of appeals separately addressed the dischargeability of the dis-
194 Walker, 142 F.3d at 815.
'
9
sCotton v. Deasy (In re Deasy), 66 Fed. Appx. 526, 526 (5th Cir. 2003).
196Williams, 337 F.3d at 506-08.
197Id. at 509 (referencing the statement in Geiger, 523 U.S. at 62, that gave knowing breach of con-
tract as an example of an intentional act resulting in an unintended injury). Before addressing whether
knowing breach of contract may constitute a willful and malicious injury, the court recited the standards
for 'willful and malicious injury" as laid out in Geiger and Miller. Miller is the seminal post-Geiger case in
the fifth circuit addressing § 523(a)(6). It holds that an injury is willful if the debtor subjectively intended
to injure the creditor or the debtor's conduct was objectively substantially certain to cause injury. Miller
further holds that willful and malicious are a unitary standard, and that malice is implied from willfulness.
Miller, 156 F.3d at 603-06.
iwsWilliams, 337 F.3d at 508.
1id. at 509.
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trict court awards based on the breach of the collective bargaining agreement
and the violation of the agreed judgment. As to the contract, the court
stated that when the debtor hired non-union electricians, he was motivated
by a desire to complete the pending project and to save his business, and thus
did not intend to injure the Union. The court stated that whether the
breach was objectively substantially certain to harm the union was a closer
question, but did not resolve the question because it concluded that it was
the individual union members, and not the union itself, that were substan-
tially certain to suffer injury as a result of the breach. The court stated that
the only direct injuries suffered by the union were to its prestige and to its
capacity to uphold its contracts, and that neither of these injuries was sub-
stantially certain to flow from the breach. 200
As to the violation of the agreed judgment, the court characterized the
debt as one for sanctions for contempt. "Failure to obey a court order consti-
tutes willful and malicious conduct," the court stated, "and a judgment
against a defiant debtor is excepted from discharge."201 The court noted that
the agreed judgment was clear and unambiguous and that the debtor knew of
his obligations and knowingly violated them. "Even if [the debtor] did not
intend to injure the Union," the court stated, the Agreed Judgment made him
substantially certain that his acts would inflict injury."202 The court distin-
guished the debtor's violation of the agreed judgment from his breach of the
collective bargaining agreement in this way: "contempt may be characterized
as an act resulting in intentional injury." The court concluded without expla-
nation that the amount awarded in the contempt proceeding "arises from the
willful and malicious injury [the debtor] inflicted by refusing to obey" the
order.203
In Walker,204 the fifth circuit considered whether the debtor, a university
professor, caused a willful and malicious injury when he retained professional
fees that he earned from outside employment in violation of his contract with
the university. The contract "expressly state[d] that all fees received by a
faculty member . . . are to be assigned to the University."205 The plaintiffs
claim sounded both in tort and in contract, although it is not entirely clear
from the opinion whether the claim for conversion under Texas law was ever
established. The court of appeals in Williams stated that it was.2 0 6 The
20 Id. at 510-11.
20 Id. at 512.
202Id.203Id.
204142 F.3d 813, 824 (1998).
205Id.
206The court in Williams stated that "[i]n Walker, the debtor committed the tort of conversion by
keeping professional fees instead of remitting them to the University of Texas in violation of his employ-
ment contract." Williams, 337 F.3d at 510. This fact or conclusion is not stated in Walker itself, however.
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district court had determined that the claim was dischargeable. The court of
appeals did not discuss the district court's reasoning, but it would not have
been essential to the district court's judgment whether the plaintiff actually
established its claim for conversion.
The Walker court held that the district court erred in holding that the
debt was dischargeable, and remanded the case on the issue whether the
plaintiffs injury was willful and malicious. The opinion can actually be read
to mean that § 523(a)(6) requires tortious conduct. The key language is the
following three sentences:
Neither a claim for breach of contract nor the tort of conver-
sion necessarily involves an intentional injury. The act of
conversion, however, can result in a "willful and malicious
injury." In addition, under Texas law, a claim for breach of
contract and the tort of conversion may arise from the same
set of facts. 207
A negative implication of the first quoted sentence is that a claim for
breach of contract, like the tort of conversion, can involve intentional injury
(and thus be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6)). (It is this sentence that
the Williams court cited as authority for the proposition that knowing
breach of contract can be willful and malicious. 2 0 8) However, the second
sentence suggests that, while not all debts for intentional torts are nondis-
chargeable under § 523(a)(6), some are, but contract claims standing alone are
not nondischargeable. This reading is seemingly confirmed in the third sen-
tence, which reiterates that the plaintiffs claim in this case sounded in both
tort and contract.
The remainder of the Walker opinion focuses on whether the debtor's
"retention of his professional fees was an 'innocent and technical' act rather
than a 'willful and malicious injury.'"209 This would depend, the court ex-
plained, on whether the debtor knew of his obligations under the contract.
At first blush, the ensuing discussion of whether the debtor knowingly
breached the employment agreement could be read to mean that the court
was addressing and implicitly approving the possible nondischargeability of a
claim for knowing breach of contract. 210 But this overlooks the first sentence
2 07Id. at 823-24 (citations omitted).
208337 F.3d at 510 (citing Miller, 156 F.3d at 606 for the proposition that the "Fifth Circuit has
acknowledged that a breach of contract may involve an intentional or substantially certain injury.")
2 \Walker, 142 F.3d at 824 (quoting Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 331 (1934)).2 1OThe court wrote:
[a]n issue of fact exists regarding whether [the debtor] was aware of his obligations
to the University under the [contract] and nonetheless knowingly kept his profes-
sional fees with the intent of depriving the University of money that he owed to
it. . . . The [contract] . . . language is crystal clear, and all [affected employees]
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of the discussion. In quoting Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co. to frame the
issue as whether the debtor's retention of the professional fees was "innocent
or technical," the court clearly had in mind the plaintiffs claim for conversion;
in Davis, the Court addressed whether the debtor's conversion of a secured
creditor's collateral was "innocent and technical" or "willful and malicious."
As the court in Walker had already noted, under Texas law, conversion and
breach of contract can arise from the same facts; thus, the debtor's knowledge
and understanding of the contract would guide the determination whether
the tort was willful and malicious.
Finally, in Cotton v. Deasy (In re Deasy),2 11 the fifth circuit court of ap-
peals read Geiger as "explicitly reject[ing] a construction of 'willful' under
which a breach of contract could qualify." The court referred to Supreme
Court's explanation in Geiger that "the (a)(6) formulation triggers in the law-
yer's mind the category of 'intentional torts,' as distinguished from negligent
or reckless torts," and also the Court's reasoning that the claimants' broader
interpretation of § 523(a)(6) "would be incompatible with the 'well-known'
guide that exceptions to discharge 'should be confined to those plainly ex-
pressed.'" Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiffs "bare breach of con-
tract claim fails, as a matter of law." The debtor in Deasy had breached a
brokerage contract to pay the plaintiff a five percent commission on the sale
of certain real property. 212
Deasy and Williams both were decided in 2003, by different panels of
judges of the court of appeals, and neither case cites the other. In any event,
the two cases are not necessarily in conflict. Deasy can be read narrowly to
mean that debts for "bare breach of contract" without more are dischargeable
under § 523(a)(6), but that the statute does not categorically exclude con-
tract claims. Read in isolation, however, the Deasy panel's explanation of its
holding quoted above suggests that § 523(a)(6) never applies to contract
claims independent of tortious conduct.
B. SIXTH CIRCUIT
In Steier v. Best (In re Best),2 1 3 the sixth circuit held that "[c]onsistent
were sent a memorandum . .. reminding them that [all professional fees] . . . shall be
deposited in the departmental . . . account. . . . If a factfinder were to decide that
[the debtor] knew of his obligations under the . . . contract . . ., then it might also
find that [he] knowingly retained his professional fees in violation of the [contract],
an act which he knew would necessarily cause the University's injury. This, in
turn, could result in a finding of 'willful and malicious injury.' Id. at 824.
21166 Fed.Appx. 526 (5th Cir. 2003) (unpublished opinion). Under the local rules of the fifth circuit
court of appeals, there is no restriction on the citation of unpublished decisions. See Robert Timothy
Reagan, Citing Unpublished Federal Appellate Opinions Issued Before 2007, 241 F.R.D. 328 (2007).
2nDeasy, 66 Fed.Appx. at 526.
2lo 9 Fed.Appx. 1 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished opinion). Under the local rules of the sixth circuit
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with Geiger, . . . a breach of contract cannot constitute the willful and mali-
cious injury required to trigger § 523(a)(6)." 2 14 The debtor had breached a
stock purchase agreement by not returning the plaintiffs investment. The
plaintiff recovered a judgment in state court for breach of contract, and the
debtor thereafter filed for relief under Chapter 7. In its brief discussion of the
dischargeability of contract claims under § 523(a)(6), the sixth circuit noted
that the plaintiff plead only breach of contract in his complaint, and did not
allege conversion. 2 1 5
The Best court relied on Salem Bend Condominium Assoc. v. Bullock-
Williams (In re Bullock-Williams), 216 decided by the sixth circuit bankruptcy
appellate panel after Geiger in 1998, for the conclusion that a breach of con-
tract cannot render a debt nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6). In Bullock-
Williams, the BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision that in failing to
pay condominium fees for over six years, while filing five bankruptcy peti-
tions, the debtor did not intend to cause harm to the creditor.
Bullock-Williams can be read as supporting the holding in Best, or not.
The creditor in Bullock-Williams argued that "nonpayment of a contractual
obligation can be a willful and malicious injury."2 17 The BAP did not explic-
itly reject this contention, but agreed with the bankruptcy court that the
proof did not support the conclusion that the debtor intended to injure the
creditor by not paying the condominium fees.21 8 Thus, the case can also be
read as recognizing that contract claims can be nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(6), as long as the injury is willful and malicious. In fact, other courts
have cited Bullock-Williams as supporting the view that § 523(a)(6) does not
require tortious conduct. 2 19 In any event, the creditor's primary contention
was that the debt for unpaid condominium fees was for a willful and mali-
cious injury because the debtor abused the bankruptcy process by filing five
court of appeals, there is no restriction on the citation of unpublished decisions. See Robert Timothy
Reagan, Citing Unpublished Federal Appellate Opinions Issued Before 2007, 241 F.R.D. 328 (2007).
2'41d. at 8.
215Id. This fact does not support the inference that the creditor did not also have the tort claim, or
that the breach of contract was not accompanied by an independent tort. See, e.g., Spinneweber v. Moran
(In Te Moran), 152 B.R. 493, 496 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993) (asserting that 'there is no requirement that the
allegations of a complaint filed in state court prior to a debtor filing a petition in bankruptcy correspond to
the elements of the grounds contained in § 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Otherwise, plaintiffs in state
court would be required to anticipate the bankruptcy of every defendant and litigate every conceivable
issue under § 523(a) in the event a defendant should subsequently file bankruptcy").
216220 BR. 345 (6th Cit. B.A.P. 1998).
217Id. at 346.
2 18Id. at 347. The BAP did not consider whether the debtor may have acted with the knowledge that
injury was substantially certain to result. Id. 346-47.
iSee, eg., The Spring Works, Inc. v. Sarff (In re Sarff), 242 B.R. 620, 626 (6th Cir. BA.P. 2000)
(stating that "[u]nder Geiger, damages for breach of contract can be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6),"
citing Bullock- Williams, 220 B.R. 345).
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petitions in six years with the intent to avoid payment of the condominium
fees. The BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding that the evidence did
not support the allegation.
In The Spring Works, Inc. v. Sarff (In re Sarff),220 the sixth circuit BAP
held that a state court judgment for breach of a covenant not to compete,
breach of contract, breach of the duty of loyalty, misappropriation of trade
secrets, intentional interference with business relations and discovery sanc-
tions collaterally estopped the debtor to contest nondischargeability of the
debt under Code § 523(a)(6). The state court made findings that supported
an inference of malice, including that the debtor had taken springs and cus-
tomers from the plaintiff, and awarded punitive damages, which required a
finding of malice. Citing Geiger and Bullock-Williams, the court stated that
damages for knowing breach of contract can be nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(6). The case is not iron-clad authority for the proposition that con-
tract claims may be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) in the absence of
tortious conduct, however, because the state court also found the debtor lia-
ble for several intentional torts based on the same conduct. Sarff was not
cited or discussed in Best.
C. SEVENTH CIRCUIT
In N.I.S. Corporation v. Hallahan (In re Hallahan),221 the seventh circuit
affirmed a judgment that a claim arising from the breach of a covenant not to
compete was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6). The case is not, however,
solid authority for the proposition that § 523(a)(6) covers contract claims
absent tortious conduct. The court did not address that question; indeed, the
debtor contested the enforceability of the covenant under Missouri law,
while conceding that if it was enforceable, the debt was for willful and mali-
cious injury. The plaintiff had also made a claim of tortious interference with
contract, which the bankruptcy court did not discuss. This case was decided
before Geiger, and the court applied the looser standard for willfulness that
Geiger subsequently disapproved.
In Radivojevic v. Pickens (In re Pickens)222 an unpublished decision, the
seventh circuit stated that § 523(a)(6) 'is intended to prevent the discharge
of debts incurred as a result of intentional torts."2 2 3 The debtor signed a one-
year lease with the plaintiff, but left the premises (for public housing) and
220242 BR. 620 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 2000).
221936 F.2d 1496 (7th Cir. 1991).
222234 F.3d 1273 (Table), 2000 WL 1071464 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 2000) (unpublished opinion). Under
the local rules of the seventh circuit court of appeals, unpublished decisions rendered before 2007 may not
be cited. See Robert Timothy Reagan, Citing Unpublished Federal Appellate Opinions Issued Before 2007,
241 F.R.D. 328 (2007).223Id at *
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stopped paying rent three months before the expiration of the lease. A nar-
row reading of the quoted sentence suggests that the court did not foreclose
an interpretation that would except from the discharge a debt for willful and
malicious injury arising from a breach of contract. 224
D. EIGHTH CIRCUIT
In its opinion in Geiger v. Kawaauhau (In re Geiger), before the Supreme
Court's decision 2 2 5 the eighth circuit indicated quite clearly in dicta that
§ 523(a)(6) concerns intentional torts, and does not cover debts for breach of
contract. In holding that the plaintiffs' judgment for medical malpractice
based on the debtor's reckless or negligent conduct was dischargeable, the
court reasoned in relevant part:
[T]he word "intentional," by itself, will, almost as a mat-
ter of natural reflex, cause a lawyer's mind to turn to that
category of wrongs known as intentional torts, a category
that excludes injuries caused by acts that are merely negli-
gent, grossly negligent, or even reckless. We presume that
when Congress uses a word that has a fixed, technical mean-
ing, it has used it as a term of art, . . .
Adopting the alternative construction, moreover, would
render virtually all tort judgments exempt from discharge.
Every act that is not literally compelled by the physical act
of another (as when someone seizes my arm and causes it to
strike another), or the result of an involuntary muscle spasm,
is a "deliberate or intentional" one, and if it leads to injury, a
judgment debt predicated on it would be immune from dis-
charge under the alternative construction of the statute . . . .
Indeed, we see no reason that a knowing breach of contract
would not result in a judgment that would be exempt from
discharge under this legal principle. Surely this proves too
much....
We therefore think that the correct rule is that a judg-
ment debt cannot be exempt from discharge in bankruptcy
unless it is based on what the law has for generations called
an intentional tort, a legal category that is based on "the
consequences of an act rather than the act itself." Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 8A, comment a, at 15 (1965). . ..
224See id.
225113 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 1997), affd, Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
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Finally, we observe that in this case we hold only that
for a judgment debt to be nondischargeable under the rele-
vant statutory provision, it is necessary that it be based on
the commission of an intentional tort. We believe, as we
have said, that the debtor's conduct cannot otherwise be said
to be "willful." . . 226
E. NINTH CIRCUIT
The ninth circuit court of appeals has addressed the dischargeability of
debts for breach of contract under § 523(a)(6) more often and more exten-
sively than any of the other circuit courts of appeals. The circuit has defini-
tively held that § 523(a)(6) does not cover debts for knowing breach of
contract unless the breach is accompanied by tortious conduct. The tortious
conduct need not be a tort independent of the breach; it is sufficient if the
breach itself also is a tort. Further, the ninth circuit has held that relevant
state law determines what constitutes "tortious conduct" for purposes of
§ 523(a)(6). The court has relied on ninth circuit precedent for this latter
proposition, but a close examination of the precedent reveals that it does not
support the proposition. 2 27
The ninth circuit has addressed the nondischargeability of debts for
knowing breach of contract under § 523(a)(6) in four cases since the Supreme
Court decided Geiger: Lockerby v Sierra (2008),228 Petralia v. Jercich (In re
Jercich) (2001),229 Banks v. Gill Distribution Centers, Inc. (In re Banks)
(200 1)230, and Del Bino v. Bailey (In re Bailey) (1999).231 Jercich is the seminal
post-Geiger case holding that § 523(a)(6) requires conduct that constitutes a
tort under the relevant state law, while Lockerby more fully develops the
reasons for this approach. Bailey implicitly required tortious conduct for
nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6), and is the source of the ninth circuit's
view that state law defines what is tortious for purposes of § 523(a)(6).
Banks appears to conflict with Jercich, Lockerby and Bailey; in Banks, the
court held that a debt for breach of contract was nondischargeable in the
apparent absence of any associated tort. The court in Banks cited Jercich,
2 2 6Id. at 852-55 (emphasis added).
227As discussed above, it is questionable whether state law or a federal common law should govern the
question whether the debtor acted tortiously for purposes of § 523(a)(6), assuming that tortious conduct
is an essential element of this exception to the discharge. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
As further discussed infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text, the difficulty posed by the question is
itself an argument against reading a tortious conduct requirement into § 523(a)(6).
228535 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).
229238 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2001).
230263 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2001).
231197 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999).
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which was decided several months earlier, but did not seem to notice the
question whether a debt for breach of contract without more can be nondis-
chargeable debt under § 523(a)(6). Each of these four cases is discussed in
the following paragraphs. The ninth circuit also held in several pre-Geiger
decisions that the "willful and malicious injury" exception requires tortious
conduct.232 The pre-Geiger case of Snoke v. Riso (In re Riso) is also briefly
discussed below.
1. PETRALIA V. JERCICH (IN RE JERCICH)2 13
In Jercich, the ninth circuit held that a debt for knowing breach of a
contact is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) if the breach was tortious,
even if the debtor did not act tortiously apart from the breach. The court
reversed the BAP's holding that "where a debtor's conduct constitutes both a
breach of contract and a tort, the debt resulting from that conduct does not
fit within § 523(a)(6) unless the liability for the tort is independent of the
liability on the contract."234
The plaintiff in Jercich was employed by the debtor, and the debtor failed
to pay him commissions as required under their employment agreement. The
plaintiff brought an action in state court, which found that the debtor had
the "clear ability to make these payments . . . but chose not to," instead using
the money to pay for personal investments, including a horse ranch; and that
the debtor's conduct was willful and amounted to oppression under Califor-
nia law. The state court awarded the plaintiff punitive damages of
$20,000.235
The court of appeals found nothing in the text of § 523(a)(6) "to indicate
that a debt arising from a breach of contract is excepted from the discharge
only if the debtor's conduct would be tortious even if no contract existed."236
The court further reasoned that the discharge in bankruptcy is for the honest
but unfortunate debtor, and that allowing the discharge of the debt in this
232See Snoke v. Riso (In re Riso), 978 F.2d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that '[i]t is well settled
that a simple breach of contract is not the type of injury addressed by § 523(a)(6)"); Barbachano v. Allen,
192 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 1951 (pre-Code case) (indicating that damages for breach of a contract were
not for willful and malicious injury).
233238 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2001).
234Id. at 1204. The BAP reasoned in part that "[t]orts have traditionally been defined as obligations
giving rise to liability that are imposed by law apart from and independent of enforcement of promises
made between parties to a contract," whereas contract obligations are based on the intentions and agree-
ment of the parties; and that "[1]imiting the scope of § 523(a)(6) in this way will assure that ordinary
breaches of contract, which are often willful, are not made nondischargeable by state laws that have
sometimes extended tort liability beyond the traditional view." Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 243 B.R.
747-51 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2000), rev'd, 238 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2001).
235Id. at 1204.
236Id. at 1205. Of course, neither is there anything in the text of the statute to indicate that a debt
arising from a breach of contract is excepted from the discharge only if accompanied by tortious conduct.
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case would contravene that basic policy. 2 3 7 Thus, the court concluded, "to
be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6), a breach of contract must be
accompanied by some form of 'tortious conduct' that gives rise to 'willful and
malicious injury."'238
The court then examined whether the debtor's conduct was tortious, and
next whether it gave rise to a willful and malicious injury. "To determine
whether [the debtor's] conduct was tortious," the court "look[ed] to Califor-
nia state law."2 3 9 Thus, while the court had initially referred to a require-
ment of "some form of 'tortious conduct,"' in this statement the court fairly
clearly indicates that state law determines what is "tortious conduct" for
purposes of § 523(a)(6), although it does not categorically dictate that state
law is the only source for determining what is "tortious conduct." The court
concluded that the debtor's bad faith breach of the contract was tortious
because it contravened a fundamental public policy of California favoring the
prompt payment of wages owed to an employee. 240 The court concluded
that the state court judgment established that the debt was for willful and
malicious injury. 241
2. LOCKERBY V. SIERRA 242
In Lockerby, the plaintiff sued the debtor, a lawyer, in state court for legal
malpractice. The parties settled the suit with an agreement by which the
debtor assigned to the plaintiff fifty percent of the fees from four of his pend-
ing cases. "Concluding for himself that [the plaintiff] did not have a legiti-
mate malpractice action," the debtor did not make the payments. 24 3 He
71d. at 1206.
23s1d.
"
9 d. The court cited Del Bino v. Bailey (In re Bailey), 197 F.3d 997, 1000 (9th Cir. 1999) for this
proposition. As discussed below, infra notes 256-67 and accompanying text, Bailey does not support the
proposition for which the court cited it.
240The court explained that under California law, -tort recovery for the bad faith breach of a contract
is permitted only when, 'in addition to the breach of the covenant [of good faith and fair dealing], a
defendant's conduct violates a fundamental public policy of the state.'" Jercich, 238 F.3d. at 1206.
24 Compare id. at 1208-09 with Oney v. Weinberg (In re Weinberg), 410 B.R. 19 (9th Cir. B.A.P.
2009), which also involved a failure to pay compensation to an employee. The plaintiff employee obtained
a default judgment in state court for the unpaid wages, plus treble damages and attorney fees as provided
by Arizona law. The BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court decision holding that the plaintiffs claim was
dischargeable. Id. at 37. The court explained that the plaintiffs claim was for breach of contract without
an associated tort, and distinguishedJercich on the grounds that the debtor inJercich not only failed to pay
his employee but also used business funds for personal investments, and engaged in despicable conduct. Id.
at 36-37. In contrast, in Weinberg the plaintiff was paid more than he originally requested, and the em-
ployer continued to pay plaintiff his percentage of receivables as they were collected. Id. The court
further reasoned that the test for willful injury is subjective, and that the trial court did not err in conclud-
ing that the debtor did not intend to injure the plaintiff given that he continued to pay the percentage of
accounts receivable as they were collected. Id. at 37.
242535 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).
2 43Lockerby, 535 F.3d at 1039.
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intentionally breached the settlement agreement, knowing that his action
would harm the plaintiff. The bankruptcy court concluded that the debt was
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), and the district court affirmed.244
In the ninth circuit, the plaintiff argued that, "while a simple breach of
contract may not be the basis for an exception to discharge, absent more, an
intentional breach of contract provides the more that is necessary when it is
accompanied with knowledge that a person is bound by an agreement and
without just cause chooses to ignore it with consequent harm to the [other]
party."2 45 The plaintiff also argued that conduct is tortious if injury is in-
tended or substantially likely to cause injury.246 (The district court, citing
Jercich,247 had agreed with this contention, and affirmed the bankruptcy
court's determination that the debt was nondischargeable.248)
In reversing the district court, the court of appeals, also citing Jercich,
began with the proposition that § 523(a)(6) requires "tortious conduct."2 49
The court found that the Supreme Court's decision in Geiger appears to re-
quire tortious conduct, because the Court affirmed the eighth circuit's hold-
ing that "523(a)(6)'s exemption from discharge . . . is confined to debts 'based
on what the law has for generations called an intentional tort;"' 250 and "spe-
cifically rejected the notion that a 'knowing breach of contract' could trigger
exception from discharge under § 523(a)(6)." 2 5 1
Next, the court of appeals rejected the argument that tortious conduct
includes conduct that is intended or substantially certain to cause injury, and
held that tortious conduct means conduct that constitutes a tort under the
relevant state law. The court reasoned:
This approach is consistent with basic principles of tort
and contract law. Historically, injuries resulting from
breaches of contract are treated very differently from injuries
resulting from torts. In contract law, "[t]he motive for the
breach commonly is immaterial in an action on the con-
2441d. at 1044.
2451d. at 1043 (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff did not argue that the debtor commit-
ted a tort according to Arizona law. The ninth circuit indicated that, in any event, the debtor's conduct
did not constitute conversion under Arizona law. Id. n.5. See Del Bino v. Bailey (In re Bailey), 197 F.3d
997 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussed infra notes 256-67 and accompanying text). In Bailey, the ninth circuit held
that under California law, the plaintiff attorney did not have a lien for his fees in settlement proceeds
although the debtor had orally promised to pay the fees from any settlement, because the client was a
minor and state law required that the fee agreement be in writing. The court therefore held that the
debtor did not commit the tort of conversion. Id. at 1000-02.
2 4 6 Lockerby, 535 F.3d at 1041-42.
247238 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001).
14'Lockerby, 535 F.3d at 1039.2491d.
250 d. at 1041 (citing Geiger, 523 U.S. at 60).
251Id. (citing Geiger, 523 U.S. at 62).
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tract." . . . The concept of "efficient breach" is built into our
system of contracts, with the understanding that people will
sometimes intentionally break their contracts for no other
reason that that it benefits them financially. The definition
of intent to injure as the commission of an act "substantially
certain" to cause harm was born from tort principles, not
contract law principles. 252
The court further reasoned that the Supreme Court's decision in Geiger also
supported this approach because it "assumed that § 523(a)(6) encompassed
only intentional torts, not intentional breaches of contract."25 3 Furthermore,
the court of appeals explained, excepting contract claims from the discharge
would be inconsistent with the Code provisions on executory contracts,
which expressly permit intentional breach of contract without regard to the
debtor's motives;254 and would "severely circumscribe" the ability of debtors
to obtain a fresh start by greatly expanding the scope of nondischargeable
debts. 255
3. DEL BINO V. BAILEY (IN RE BAILEY) 2 5 6
In both Lockerby and Jercich, the ninth circuit held that state law deter-
mines what is tortious for purposes of § 523(a)(6). In Lockerby, the court
citedJercich and Bailey for the proposition, but did not otherwise address the
issue. Jercich also cited Bailey without addressing the merits of the issue. 2 5 7
In Bailey, the debtor attorney took over the representation of client (a
minor) previously represented by the plaintiff attorney, and orally agreed to
pay the plaintiff a portion of the attorney's fees and costs recovered in any
settlement of the matter. However, upon settling the case, the debtor failed
to remit any proceeds of the settlement to the plaintiff. When the debtor
thereafter filed for bankruptcy, the plaintiff objected to the dischargeability
of his claim under § 523(a)(6). In holding for the debtor, the court of appeals
reasoned in four steps: (1) "conversion of another's property . . . intentionally
and without justification and excuse, . . . constitutes a willful and malicious
injury;"' 258 (2) "[w]hile bankruptcy law governs whether a claim is nondis-
2 52 Id. at 1041-42.
2531Id. at 1042.
254Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)) (permitting rejection of executory contracts and leases that do not
hold value to the estate) and (g) (referring expressly to rejection as a breach).
2
ssThe court in Lockerby distinguished Jercich on the ground that the breach of contract in Jercich was
accompanied by conduct that was tortious under California law, whereas Lockerby involved only the non-
payment of an "ordinary debt" and no conduct tortious under Arizona law was alleged. Id. at 1043.
216197 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999).
25 7Jercich, 238 F.3d at 1206 & n.16.
258Id. at 1000 (quoting Transamerican Comm. Fin. Corp. v. Littleton (In re Littleton), 942 F.2d 551,
554 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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chargeable under 523(a)(6), this court looks to state law to determine
whether an act falls within the tort of conversion;" 2 59 (3) the debtor did not
commit the tort of conversion as it is defined under California law;260 (4)
therefore, although the plaintiff held a claim for payment of the fees and costs,
the claim was not nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).261 Although the
court did not expressly state that § 523(a)(6) requires tortious conduct, this
conclusion necessarily underlies the court's reasoning that the debt was dis-
chargeable because the debtor's conduct did not amount to conversion. Thus,
Bailey can be cited along with Lockerby,Jercich, Riso and Weinberg262 for the
rule that tortious conduct is an essential element of § 523(a)(6).
It is the second step in the court's line of reasoning that the ninth circuit
later references in Jercich and Lockerby for the proposition that state law
determines what is tortious under 523(a)(6). In support of the proposition,
the court in Bailey cited two cases, Andrews v. Manser (In re Manser)263 and
Quarre' v. Saylor (In re Saylor),2 64 both decided by the ninth circuit bank-
ruptcy appellate panel. However, neither Manser nor Saylor addressed
whether state law determines what is tortious for purposes of the dis-
chargeability determination under § 523(a)(6). Indeed, although the holding
in Manser is somewhat unclear, the court states that a debt is nondischarge-
able where it is for a conversion that is willful and malicious under Code
§ 523(a)(6) without regard to whether the debtor's conduct constituted con-
version under state law. 2 65
In Manser, like Bailey, the court considered whether the plaintiffs' claims
could be nondischargeable where the debtor's conduct did not amount to
conversion under state law. In Manser, the debtor's corporation had entered
into consignment agreements with the plaintiffs, who were artisans who sup-
plied crafts on consignment to the debtor. The agreements required the cor-
poration to pay over proceeds from the sale of the consigned goods, however,
the debtor applied some of these funds to his personal use. The debtor ar-
gued that under California law, the failure to pay over proceeds from the sale
2591d. (citing Quarr6 v. Saylor (In re Saylor), 178 B.R. 209, 214 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1995), and Andrews v.
Manser (In re Manser), 99 B.R. 434, 435-36 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1989)).
2 The court reasoned that there was no conversion because the plaintiff did not have a property
interest in the settlement proceeds, and that he did not have a property interest in the proceeds because
the representation was of a minor and under California Family Code § 6602, "[a] contract for attorney's
fees for services in litigation, made by or on behalf of a minor, is void unless the contract is approved . . .by
the court." Bailey, 197 F.3d at 1001.
261Id. at 1002. Cf. Peklar v. Ikerd (In re Peklar), 260 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that,
while Bailey held that a debt for conduct that did not constitute conversion was not nondischargeable, this
does not mean that a debt for conduct that constitutes conversion is necessarily nondischargeable).
262 0ney v. Weinberg (In re Weinberg), 410 B.R. 19 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2009) (discussed supra note 241).
26399 B.R. 434 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1989).
264178 B.R. 209 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1995).
26 5Manser, 99 B.R. at 435-36.
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of personal property that was authorized to be sold did not constitute con-
version, and therefore the debts were dischargeable. The court rejected this
contention, and, in contrast to the proposition for which the case was cited in
Bailey, stated that "[w]hether the [debtor's] actions constitute the tort of
conversion under California state law is not dispositive of whether the under-
lying claims are non-dischargeable." Rather, the court held, the issues are
whether the conduct giving rise to the claims was willful and malicious.266
The holding in Manser is a not entirely clear because the court was careful to
note that the plaintiffs were entitled to the proceeds because they held a
security interest in them, so presumably, the debtor's conduct was in fact a
conversion under state law.
In Saylor,267 the court held that the plaintiff did not have a claim against
the debtors based on a fraudulent transfer they had made several years before
they filed for bankruptcy. (Rather, the plaintiffs claim was against the trans-
ferees.) There being no claim against the debtors, there was nothing to ex-
cept from the discharge. Again, the underlying principle is inconsistent with
the point for which the court of appeals cited the case in Bailey. In Saylor,
the BAP carefully distinguishes the question whether the claimant has a
claim, which is a matter of state law, from the issue whether any such claim is
nondischargeable, which is a question of federal bankruptcy law. In this vein,
the BAP rejected the argument that the fraudulent transfer was a conversion
or another tort under state law.
In sum, the ninth circuit has held in Lockerby, Jercich and Bailey that state
law determines what is tortious for purposes of the implied tortious conduct
requirement in § 523(a)(6). The rule was conceived in Bailey, but the court
relied on precedent that does not support the rule. While the rule may very
well be preferable to defining "tortious conduct" under federal law, the ninth
circuit has not expressly considered the merits of the competing approaches
(nor has any other circuit court).
4. BANKS v. GILL DISTRIuTION CENTERS, INC.2 6 8
The court in Banks did not discuss the question whether tortious con-
duct is an essential element of § 523(a)(6), but affirmed the bankruptcy
court's determination that the debtor's debt for breach of a contract was
nondischargeable although it appears that there was no associated tortious
conduct.269 Thus, Banks is inconsistent with Jercich, Lockerby and Bailey.
The debtor in Banks had agreed to pay a portion of any recovery in a pending
law suit to one of the parties, however, he failed to do so. The bankruptcy
266Id
267178 B.R. 209 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1995).
268263 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2001).
26Id. at 869-70.
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court found that the debtor failed to pay the plaintiff either because he
sought to renegotiate the amount to which the plaintiff was entitled or to
delay payment until the statute of limitations had run. Accordingly, the
bankruptcy court concluded that the debtor intended to injure the plaintiff
and that the plaintiffs injury was therefore willful and malicious.270 It is
possible that the debtor committed fraud or conversion, but neither of these
possibilities entered into the court's reasoning. The court cited Jercich re-
garding the standard for "willful" injury under § 523(a)(6), but not in regard
to any requirement of tortious conduct.
Banks, like Saylor above, could be cited for the notion that nondis-
chargeability under § 523(a)(6) is a matter of federal law, and therefore fed-
eral law rather than state law should determine what constitutes tortious
conduct for purposes of the tortious conduct requirement under the excep-
tion. The principal issue in Banks concerned the debtor's contention that the
debt was dischargeable because the plaintiffs action in state court was based
on a claim for breach of contract, and not on a cause of action that connoted a
willful and malicious injury. The plaintiff may have had a claim for fraud, but
the statute of limitations on such a claim had run by the time he filed his
state court suit. The debtor argued that any objection to dischargeability
lapsed with the running of the statute of limitations on the fraud claim under
state law. In rejecting the debtor's argument, the court explained that
whether the plaintiff holds a claim is determined by state law, while its
nondischargeability is determined by federal law. Here, the debtor held a
claim, based on contract, under state law. "[T]here is no requirement that
the allegations of a complaint filed in state court prior to a debtor filing a
petition in bankruptcy correspond to the elements of the grounds contained
in § 523(a)(6)," the court explained. "Otherwise plaintiffs in state court
would be required to anticipate the bankruptcy of every defendant and liti-
gate every conceivable issue under § 523(a) in the event a defendant should
subsequently file bankruptcy.'" 2 71
Although Banks does not appear to require tortious conduct for nondis-
chargeability under § 523(a)(6), the holding of the case is not inconsistent
with such a requirement. Reading Banks with Jercich, Lockerby and Bailey,
Banks means simply that a plaintiff with claims in both tort and contract may
choose to seek recovery on only the contract claim in state court without
forgoing the right to later object to the discharge of the claim under
270 4d
27 11d. at 868 (quoting Spinnenweber v. Moran, 152 B.R. 493 (Bankr. S.D.Ohio 1993)). The seminal
case establishing this principle followed by the court in Gill is Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S.127, 134-39
(1979) (holding that res judicata did not preclude plaintiff from ligitigating the dischargeability of a debt
where he had not asserted a claim for fraud in his state court collection action against the debtor prior to
the filing of the bankruptcy case).
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§ 523(a)(6) in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding. In order for the debt to
be excepted from the discharge in bankruptcy, however, the plaintiff will
have to prove that the debtor also committed a tort.
5. SNOKE V. RisO (IN RE RISO)2 72
Finally, in Riso, a pre-Geiger decision, the ninth circuit court of appeals
held that a right of first refusal is not property within the meaning of
§ 523(a)(6), so that the debtor's breach of the agreement did not constitute a
conversion that was willful and malicious. The court rejected the plaintiffs
argument that his right of first refusal was akin to a security interest in the
property, which he had sold to the debtor, subject to the option. The court
stated that "[i]t is well settled that a simple breach of contract is not the
type of injury addressed by § 523(a)(6)," and that "[a]n intentional breach of
contract is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6) only when it is accom-
panied by malicious and willful tortious conduct."273 There was no evidence
in this case that the breach was tortious.
F. TENTH CIRCUIT
The tenth circuit has stated in a pre-Geiger published opinion and in a
post-Geiger unpublished opinion that debts for knowing breach of contract
may be excepted from the discharge under § 523(a)(6) in the absence of tor-
tious conduct. In Sanders v. Vaughn (In re Sanders),274 the tenth circuit
affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision that the plaintiffs contract claim
was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6). The debtor had hired the plaintiff
attorney on a contingency fee basis to seek a tax refund from the IRS. The
contract gave the plaintiff a power of attorney and stipulated that tax refund
checks would be sent to the plaintiff. Upon learning that the IRS was will-
ing to pay him $30,000 to settle his claim, the debtor wrote a letter to the
IRS revoking the power of attorney and directing that the refund check be
sent to him. In this way, the bankruptcy court said, the debtor "beat [the
plaintiff] out of the fee."275
The court of appeals rejected the argument that Geiger expressly excludes
breach of contract claims from § 523(a)(6), calling this a "misreading of Gei-
ger, which stands rather for the proposition that an injury must be 'desired
272978 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir. 1992).
273Id. at 1154.
274210 F.3d 390 (Table), 2000 WL 328136 (10th Cir. Mar. 29, 2000) (unpublished opinion). Under
the local rules of the tenth circuit court of appeals, there is no restriction on the citation of unpublished
decisions. See Robert Timothy Reagan, Citing Unpublished Federal Appellate Opinions Issued Before
2007, 241 F.R.D. 328 (2007).
27s1d. at *2
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]or in fact anticipated by the debtor."' 276 "Contrary to [the debtor's] inter-
pretation," the court continued, "nothing in Geiger indicates the Supreme
Court's intention to immunize debtors under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) for 'will-
ful and malicious' breaches of contract."277 In affirming the lower court, the
tenth circuit did not separately consider the "willful" and "malicious" prongs
of the statute.
The court addressed the issue in Sanders as involving the dischargeability
of a breach of contract claim, but the facts might very well have supported a
conclusion that the debtor had committed the tort of conversion. The agree-
ment giving the plaintiff a power of attorney and stipulating that refund
checks would be sent to the plaintiff was in effect, if not in law, an assign-
ment of the refund, and the debtor's breach of the contract thus was also a
conversion.278 Accordingly, Sanders does not stand unequivocally for the
proposition that a debt for knowing breach of contract can be excepted from
discharge under § 523(a)(6) independent of any tort.
The tenth circuit in Sanders did not cite its pre-Geiger decision in Dorr,
Bentley & Pecha, C.P.A.'s, P.C. v. Pasek (In re Pasek).279 In Pasek, the court
affirmed the bankruptcy court and BAP decisions that the debtor's breach of
a covenant not to compete did not give rise to a willful and malicious in-
jury.280 The court assumed that the debtor's debt for breach of the covenant
could be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), while holding that the bank-
ruptcy court was not clearly erroneous in concluding that the debt was dis-
chargeable on the facts of the case. The debtor had knowingly and
deliberately breached his covenant not to compete by recruiting past clients
after leaving the plaintiff CPA firm. However, the bankruptcy court also
found that he acted with just cause or excuse where the plaintiff had sought
to materially alter the partnership agreement by regulating aspects of the
debtor's personal and family life and imposing an unreasonable billable hour
quota on the debtor. Further, the debtor reasonably relied on a legal opinion
2761d. (quoting Geiger, 523 U.S. at 62).2 77Id.
2 78See supra notes 169-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of breach of contract cases in which
the debtor failed to pay monies from a source designated in the contract.
279983 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir. 1993).
2
sold. at 1528. Accord, Berger v. Buck (In re Buck), 220 B.R. 999, 1004-05 (10th Cir. B.A.P. 1998). In
Buck, the plaintiff had obtained a judgment against the debtor-attorney in state court for breach of con-
tract. The attorney had rejected two settlement offers without informing his client, the plaintiff, and
thereafter the state court entered summary judgment for the defendant. Id. at 1001. The BAP affirmed
the bankruptcy court's holding that the debt was dischargeable because the debtor did not act willfully.
Id. at 1004-05. The BAP did not expressly consider whether breach of contract claims are per se dis-
chargeable under § 523(a)(6), but appeared to assume that there is no categorical rule. See id. The bank-
ruptcy court rendered its decision before Geiger, and the BAP issued its opinion after Geiger. The BAP
referred to Geiger for the standard for willfulness, id. at 1004, but did not consider Geiger's dicta regarding
dischargeability of breach of contract claims.
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that the covenant not to compete was not enforceable. 281
Pasek is a pre-Geiger case in which the court applied the standard for
willfulness that the Supreme Court subsequently adopted in Geiger. The
court stated the tenth circuit rule to be that "'willful and malicious injury'
occurs when the debtor, without justification or excuse, and with full knowl-
edge of the specific consequences of his conduct, acts notwithstanding, know-
ing full well that his conduct will cause particularlized injury." The court
explained that proof of actual knowledge of injury does not per se mandate a
finding of willful and malicious injury. "[T]here are no absolutes. In each
case, evidence of the debtor's motives, including any claimed justification or
excuse, must be examined to determine whether the requisite 'malice' in addi-
tion to 'willfulness' is present."282
In the opinion below, the BAP reasoned in part as follows regarding the
nondischargeability of contract claims under § 523(a)(6):
It is almost always foreseeable in the abstract that a breach
of contract will result in some form of economic harm to the
other party to the contract. A breach of contract frequently
results from an intentional act by the party which chooses
not to complete its obligations under the contract for
whatever reason. For example, a company may intentionally
choose to discontinue performing under a contract that
proved unprofitable. That choice is an intentional act that
foreseeably will result in economic injury to the other party.
However, an intentional breach of contract, without more, is
not sufficient to establish a willful and malicious injury for
the purposes of § 523(a)(6).
The focus, for dischargeability purposes, is not on the
wrongfulness of the intentional breach. Instead, the focus for
§ 523(a)(6) is on the debtor's intent when he took the ac-
tion. If, for example, the company . . . breached the contract
for the express purpose of putting the other company, which
was a business rival, out of business, then the intent to in-
jure, and therefore the willfulness of the actions, is
established.283
In affirming, the tenth circuit did not specifically endorse the BAP's rea-
soning, however, the BAP's reasoning is consistent with the circuit court's.
The circuit court fairly clearly reasoned that, while the debtor acted will-
281Id.
282Id. at 1527.
283Dorr & Assocs. v. Pasek (In re Pasek), 129 B.R. 247, 252 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1991), affd, 983 F.2d
1524 (10th Cir. 1993).
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fully, there was just cause or excuse for his actions and therefore the injury
was not malicious. Similarly, the BAP indicates that the debtor's conduct
was willful, but that the statute requires something "more" than an inten-
tional breach of contract for nondischargeability. Neither court read
§ 523(a)(6) to require tortious conduct.
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